

A
CHALLENGE

CHILI'S VINDICATION

WITH PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTIONS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

BY JOHN TRUMBULL

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VALPARAISO:

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PREFACE

To the American Public :

The following pages have been written in no spirit of animosity, but have been wrung by a sense of duty from one who has your blood in his veins. To write without feeling has been impossible, but truth alone is what has been sought. The aim has been to avoid personalities; but in attacking U. S. Representatives in their official capacities, to speak the truth bluntly and to unmask rascality without fear, in order to enlighten your public and thus to change your feelings towards Chili.

As a God-fearing man I write to honest men, and only crave a hearing.

JOHN TRUMBULL.

Before the spirit of revolt against Balmaceda's pretensions became manifest, he had broached, to Mr. Egan the U. S. Minister to Chili, the subject of the nitrate fields in the rich Tarapacá district and of the desirability that American capital should be there represented. British interests in that province he portrayed as too dominant, and expressed his desire that the way be opened for the entrance and investment of American capital. Embryonic plans for the formation of a syndicate, and hints at concessions and privileges were offered. While Mr. Egan could see the personal advantages thus tendered him, he expressed the utter impossibility for him as U. S. Minister to appear in these preliminary plans, and therefore offered to introduce a friend through whom the necessary arrangements could be made. Mr. Tripler U. S. Consul in Coquimbo, was taken to see the President, and had several interviews with him relative to the subject of the nitrate fields. As the breach between the Executive and Congress began to widen, Mr. Tripler hesitated, and finally drew back, awaiting a more propitious time for launching the project.

Mr. Egan's pronounced hatred of the English was undoubtedly also a powerful motive in leading him to espouse Balmaceda's cause. Here was a chance to wreak vengeance on the people whence he hailed, to run counter to the prevailing sentiments among all foreigners, especially British, to obstruct their business and diminish their prestige and influence: and thus Balmaceda by his tact in fostering hatred and vengeance, and by his luring projects, had gained a staunch friend.

To Chili's credit, be it said, that revolt came. If resort to arms be ever justified to wrest power from an oppressing ruler, it was so in the case of Chili. Here was a man, President of the Nation, by legal right, who in pursuit of his ambitious and vain notions regarding personal power, went the length of corrupting the people, of removing upright men from military positions so as to surround himself with mercenary followers on whom he might rely for any kind of work, of removing judges, hospital administrators, visiting physicians and employees, unless abject alle-

giance were offered to him personally, of muzzling the right to free speech, of forbidding public meetings, of closing telegraph and telephone lines, of searching the mails, of establishing hateful espionage, of seeking to name and force acceptance of his successor in office, of disregarding and despising the National Congress, of asserting his right to interpret the Constitution and to assume dictatorial powers. Could a free thinking people accept such a rule without "an attempt at revolution" as gauged by Mr. Egan?

The fleet has the honor of having struck the first blow. Without any preparation, (such as Mr. Egan informs his Government) relying solely on public support, on the justice of their cause, and on Him who rules the destinies of nations, a stand was made. If ever a heroic step was taken by men, it was that which on January 7th., 1891, occurred in Valparaiso Bay, when a handful of men, without preparation further than implicit faith in the ultimate success of their cause, raised the standard of revolt against one who then had 5000 men to do his bidding, with an organized band of unscrupulous followers to serve as active lieutenants.

Unlike any other revolution, here, the navy espoused only the cause of Congress. It demanded the presence on board of representatives of both Houses. It required from Congress a formal request for support against one who, assuming dictatorial powers, had, at least for six days, been beyond the pale of law, a disregarder of the Constitution, a sneerer at the people's rights, an unmasked tyrant. But no sooner had the Congressional flag been raised on the "Blanco" than Balmaceda closed every Opposition paper, which, with a single exception, meant all the respectable press of Chili; types and presses were destroyed; courts of justice were abolished; the Supreme Court was ignored and wiped out of existence; martial law prevailed every where; spies were about, and an unguarded word of protest against existing things meant imprisonment; the prisons were overcrowded with respectable citizens who before had tried to stem the course of Balmaceda; terrorism was rampant; flogging and the most brutal of tortures were of daily occurrence; conscription of recruits was made with the lasso or by nightly raids, so little did men enlist though offered a bonus for so doing. Balmaceda countenanced, abetted, and represented all this. Only a fool could have been blind to the existing order of things, and Mr. Egan has never been accused of lack of intellectual power or acuteness. On what basis other than lack of moral standards can one explain that Mr. Egan should in his letters and telegrams assure the U. S. Government that "*perfect order is maintained throughout the country*"? When he wrote that, he asserted as patent a falsehood as was ever made, and he

cannot find shelter behind the plea of ignorance. No! He was favorable to Balmaceda, his assistance had been secured, and therefore he stopped at nothing. He even had the assumption to write Secretary Blaine, "an interesting feature of the struggle is the contention on the part of the President for a popular representative status, similar to that occupied by the President of the U. S." An Admiral, who likewise received his bias from Mr. Egan, also likened Balmaceda to Lincoln—that is, one who often sought to save men from death, contrasted with him who could telegraph an order for men to be shot even before the court martial had decided upon their guilt or innocence; one who labored, suffered and died that the shackles might fall from numberless slaves, linked by an officer of the U. S. navy with him who sought to make his people worse than slaves; one who died a martyr's death, named in the same breath with him who later died by his own hand, with a copy of the penal code open by his bed side, confessing thus that at the bar of his own conscience he found that he must die for his crimes. Remembering all this, which the U. S. Minister could not help knowing, how can one explain the utter falsity of the official messages to Washington? Untruth is stamped on them all; but then Mr. Egan could accept as his own Consul Mc-Creery's words, "so far, they (the authorities) have refused no favors I have asked." Again he could say, "Both the German and British Ministers have made strong protests and taken up a very hostile attitude towards the government in relation to this question (duties on shipments, from Ports occupied by revolutionists). I have, on the other hand, been careful to avoid any such action, although pressed by some American shipping houses to make similar protest. I have, however, obtained full and friendly assurances that American vessels will not be subjected to any inconveniences." Were deceit and unwavering support the price Mr. Egan paid for these favors and these comforting promises?

The cowardly firing on the *Blanco Encalada*, when assurances had mutually been given to maintain the "status quo", and where it was known the officers only at the revolver point had kept the men from answering the treachery with their fire, he reports untruthfully as "a few shots between one of the forts at Valparaiso and the ironclad *Blanco Encalada*."

Mr. Egan's silence is often as misleading and therefore as untruthful as his official utterances. He says even before the open revolt, "the agitation on the part of the Opposition will continue until the election of members of Congress in March next. Then however, the President's party will, so far as I can now judge, secure a majority." This was perfectly

true, but he maintained a misleading silence as to the methods which would secure that majority. On the eve of that election (?) again, "the Government supporters will also carry, without difficulty, almost the entire representation at the elections for Congress. The Government expects that this will be a severe blow to the prestige of the revolutionists, who *claim to act* in the name and by the authority of the National Congress." "Claim to act" carries its venom of prejudice and spite, and he thus prostitutes his official authority by seeking to conceal from his own Government the facts which rendered the March Congress a time-serving lot of adherents, named at Balmaceda's will and pleasure. In Valparaiso we certainly had no election, hardly the farce of one, though I sought to find that; and the German Minister felt it incumbent on him to call attention to the actual condition of things. Baron von Gutschmid wrote his [Government what was true and what any number of foreigners, including many U. S., citizens, can testify to as correct. On February 1st, 1891, he writes, "As without doubt, electoral frauds, on a grand scale will be committed, the Congress to be elected March 1st will give an overwhelming Government majority, which is sure to grant all that is asked of it." Again, on March 31st, 1891, he advises his Government:—"On the 29th, the elections for Congress took place. The result agrees entirely with what was anticipated, as for the Senate and House of Deputies, only Government candidates have triumphed. It goes without saying, that in the actual state of affairs it is needless to speak of an electoral campaign and a free electoral struggle. Martial law was not suspended even for election day; and the right to public meeting continued suppressed. There is no press, other than a few sheets favorable to the Government, and there has been no free telegraphic communication with the interior. I need hardly mention that the influential classes, which are openly opposed to the Government, neither took, nor could take, any part in the election. The chiefs of the political parties comprised in the opposition and which represent the highest social classes, are to be found, some with the fleet, others in prison, and others still are fugitives or in concealment. Some owners of extensive estates, who were living on their *haciendas*, were reduced to prison under various pretexts on the days preceding the election, and this having taken place, are once more being set at liberty."

Not so with Mr. Egan, who again writes, "a *general election* was held in all parts of the country except Tarapacá, resulting in the return of 30 Senators and 90 Congressmen, *nearly all* supporters of the government. The elections passed off without any disturbance, the opposition taking but

little part." Yet again, in another despatch, "the Congressional elections were all in favor of the government."

The same use of a deceptive word, which carried the idea of a free voicing of the National sentiment because of his suppression of the actual state of affairs, is shown when he reports that Señor Don Claudio Vicuña, "was unanimously chosen as candidate for the Presidency by the national Convention of the Liberal Party"; and when he announces the "perfect, unanimity" with which Don Claudio was chosen by the electoral college. If honest and truthful, could he fail to see the pressure under which the electoral college was, when Balmaceda's absolute control in choosing and manipulating its members be remembered?

The loyalty of troops made solid by daily rations of wine and cigarettes, and which openly went about in squads to receive what suited their fancy at all sorts of stores, is but another instance of Mr. Egan's bad faith in concealing important facts from his Government. He knew they were men forced into service, pampered to keep them good natured and loyal, and terrified into obedience by the whip and occasional examples of shooting.

Mr. Blaine's prejudices against the English received careful attention from the astute Minister in Santiago. He draws the long bow about the unheard of generosity of English managers in the nitrate *oficinas* in paying men for service in the Congressional army. Mr. John Thomas North is credited with having contributed £ 100,000 to the cause. "The attitude of Great Britain will, when the present troubles have disappeared, be severely judged by all Chilians". "The Government is not disposed to entertain any propositions for peace emanating from German or British Ministers," etc., etc. But the most flagrant and cowardly instance occurs after the close of the war. In the attempt to show to what length British dislike for Balmaceda went, he says, about asylum:—"The only legation which closed its doors and denied asylum was that of England which refused to admit a single person." Honest manliness would have led him to keep silence or state that, only a few weeks before, the British Minister was burned out of house and home, that he was living with his wife who was in delicate health in a couple of rooms in a friend's house, and that it was therefore an impossibility for him to receive refugees. Again in telegram of Sept. 27th, to show the slighting of U. S. Government, with favors granted to English Minister, he himself corrects, though a month later, the preceding falsehood only to add another when he says, "safe conduct was immediately granted to two of the officers of the army who entered English Legation." In the letter of September 29th, "the English

Legation refused to take any refugees, but one or two army officers who escaped from a neighbouring house that was being searched, did get in there across the roof, and for those the Government *did not hesitate to grant safe conducts.*" October 8th, he has to swallow this second falsehood when he says, "the refugee in the English Legation having promised to go home and remain there has been permitted to go. *No one has been granted a safe conduct to leave the country.*" The knot hole is evidently "leave the country," but the dishonesty here apparent served to make Mr. Blaine and President Harrison feel that invidious distinctions were being made in the treatment toward the two Ministers, and that has no semblance of truth in it. From both legations they were free "to go home and remain there."

Need further examples be cited of what can only be considered as intentioned evil, and studied purpose to arouse unjustifiable prejudice, warp the judgment of, and breed ill feeling in the State Department? When the judge of Crimes was investigating the *Baltimore* tragedy, and when efforts were being made to over-ride Chilian laws and compel, what never occurs under their procedure, open court, or the admission of counsel or officers of the U. S. vessels at the hearing, Mr. Egan thinks it important enough *to cable* the following on November 3rd: "The U. S. Consul at Valparaiso reports that the same judge who would not allow an officer of the *Baltimore* to be present, permitted the Secretary of the German Consul to attend the investigation of the killing of the German man-of-war's man, which took place last month". This suited his purpose; it served to stir up ill-feeling. It called for a special cable to arouse attention. On November 6th., the Consul corrects the above, saying: "Referring to my communication to you of 2nd inst, upon further inquiry I learn that, at the time that said Secretary was present only Germans, comrades of the injured man, were examined, but he was not present at the remainder of the investigation of the case referred to". On the day this correction was received, November 7th., Mr. Egan cables at length, but makes no mention of the false impression given four days previous. He instead *delegates the correction to correspondence* written on the same day, which was received in Washington on Dec. 14th., and thereby allowed that untruth to sow discord and ill feeling for fully six weeks.

There is another contradiction that merits explanation. Mr. Egan, recounting the farsical explosion of a bomb to break off the peace negotiations, says, May 18th, "he (Mr. Godoy) *declared the negotiations broken off* and becoming excited, he added that from that moment the safe conduct should be considered cancelled, and that we might not be

surprised if some of the parties were shot in the public square before morning, as he considered them responsible for the attempt that had been made against his life—that he spoke with full authority for the President and all the Ministers.” About this, the U. S. Minister, only in answer to an inquiry from Mr. Wharton, cables “that the report that the insurgent envoys would be shot grew out of a *vague threat* of the Minister of the Interior made under excitement.” Again the official letter to the Delegates, drawn up and signed by the Ministers of the United States, France and Brazil, says, “Before we were able to come to an understanding upon the manner of arranging this question of form, *the Government*, alluding to an incident entirely unconnected with this matter, which had occurred in the evening of the same day, *declared the negotiations broken off.*” But the untruthful Mr. Egan writes to Admiral Mc. Cann, “*the late negotiations were broken off because the Delegates of the Opposition would not consent that their bases of peace should be made known to the Government until the latter had first given in writing to us as mediators its conditions.*” This extract, further, is from the famous letter to Admiral Mc. Cann written from a “disinterested standpoint,” which says, “it seems to me that the Government cannot be disturbed”; but when Don Isidoro Errázuriz’s sharp reproof came, Mr. Egan says to Admiral Mc. Cann, “*I am sorry you wrote at all to Mr. Errázuriz, as those matters are always better treated verbally.*” Good faith, uprightness and honesty never penned such a hint; but Mr. Egan is wary of written documents.

This breaking off of the peace negotiations contains another feature, which can only be galling to every American because of the manner in which Mr. Egan played with the honor and dignity of the United States. In granting safe conducts to the peace delegates, through the Ministers of the United States, France and Brazil, it was unconditional, as witness this extract, “Consequently, the Minister of Foreign Relations, in the name of the Government concedes personal guaranty to the extent that the following gentlemen cannot be arrested, imprisoned, nor molested in any manner whatsoever;... and in case the said conferences do not produce favorable results, the present guaranty will continue for such time as the said honorable diplomatic Ministers may designate.” When Mr. Godoy’s “vague threat” was made, after “one of the bombs had exploded with terrific force a short distance from the Ministers, but fortunately without doing any damage”, and which it was known beforehand would be exploded to terminate the conferences, Mr. Egan contented himself with telling these gentlemen that they must hide, and that Balmaceda would not grant them safe conducts to leave on the *Baltimore* unless they promised to take no

part in the Revolutionary movement in the North. They of course refused to accede to this, and had to protest to the U. S. Minister who had officially become responsible for their safety, that they had been offered unconditional safe conducts. Mr. Egan is said to have gone so far as to excuse himself because he could not be expected to make a "casus belli" of the incident; and they sailed away, not in a U. S. man-of-war, but on a French war vessel, because the French Charge d'Affaires insisted that these delegates must have safe conducts, and that any injury done them would be regarded as an insult to France. Balmaceda had to yield; but as showing that Mr. Egan was not disposed to insist on the fulfilment of the guarantees offered through him on May 2nd, as above quoted, you are referred to a letter of Admiral McCann, page 253, red book, in which he quotes from a letter from Mr. Egan the following:—"The Government would only consent to allow the Opposition delegates to go on board the *Baltimore* upon receiving a promise that they would take no part in the revolutionary movement North, which promise none of these gentlemen would make. Upon this point the matter has been broken off *and the delegates must now conceal themselves as best they can here in Santiago.*" Evidently, Mr. Egan was disposed to leave them to their fate, regardless of obligations officially assumed in the name and authority of your Government.

Can such a man have represented the sentiment of the United States? A thousand times, no! The descendants and heirs to the glorious Puritan traditions of honor, uprightness and fair dealing never dreamed that their interests were in such hands, or a cry from the Atlantic to the Pacific would have demanded the recall of Mr. Egan. This exposure may be too late for that, but it cannot fail to enlighten the U. S. public, and show on what unstable and untrustworthy information your Government assumed its hostile tone toward Chili. Your people were hoodwinked. Your Government falsely informed and deceived; the prestige of your good name weakened. You were led to the brink of war because of your unworthy representation on this coast. Is it not time that diplomatic and consular appointments cease to be used in payment of political services? Better pay for such out of the national treasury, rather than allow your good name to be thus smirched again!

Are these terms too strong? Please read on patiently. Mr. Egan from the first sided with the Dictator. Balmaceda's proclamation and messages are sent to Washington with words of approval, while the manly protests of Congress he ignores. He sought to have a one sided view taken; and therefore, the Dictator's papers, written for circulation abroad, go home *commended and made his own* when Mr. Egan writes on January 19th, "*In*

it (Balmaceda's proclamation) *you will find a very full and interesting exposition of the causes which have led up to the present attempt at revolution.*" When therefore the newspaper reports of outrages begin to raise a current of feeling in the U. S. against his protege, Mr. Egan writes to counteract these "gross inventions and exaggerations." He says only 14 or 15 military men remain confined "in the Government prisons;" whereas in Santiago alone more than 50 still remained, and who can tell the number of those elsewhere. He would have it believed prisoners were treated "with every consideration," and actually feasted by a French caterer. He makes out there were no "cruelties and atrocities"—that they are "imaginary." The men who recount the bleeding, mangled, sloughing backs, the torn and twisted muscles which they have seen, bear testimony, and did at that time, that these were not reports of imaginary cruelties. Mr. Egan paints a picture without any outrage, without any flogging, without any murder, without any hounding persecution of defenceless women, without any orders such as were given by the tyrant's closest friends to have a prominent Opposition leader's property destroyed, his houses burned, and even an order sent that his daughters should be given over to the soldiery to gratify their lust.—Such were the friends whom Mr. Egan paints in glowing and admiring colors, and whom he deceitfully induced your Government to support. Is any language too strong? Let a father's heart make answer, let a brother's indignation speak its verdict!

However, the Hon. Patrick Egan did not limit himself to painting everything favorable to his would be friend in nitrate schemes and in North & South American Construction Co. claims; nor to at first belittling the Opposition, its victories, resources, motives, etc., and finally to doing all in his power to render the Washington Government suspicious and resentful toward the successful party. He took a more active part in what was transpiring. On March 8th, he cables request of the Chilian Government that \$4,000,000 bar silver be shipped by a U. S. vessel to Montevideo, as they feared its capture by the fleet if sent in the regular course of business. Receiving no reply to a request that might have been left to be made through the Minister at Washington, on April 1st he tries to hurry up the State Department. On April 21st, *he virtually asks his Government to sell Balmaceda a cruiser*, when he cables, "*the Chilian Government urgently requests that the proposition of the Chilian Minister for the purchase of a man-of-war be favorably considered.*" The proposition having been made, what need to mention it except as it might lead the Washington authorities to be influenced by his evident desire to gratify Balmaceda? At the request of the Chilian Government he cables the *Itata's* presence in San Diego. Was that

fact unknown in Washington, or did it make no difference what expense was entailed in cabling? As this was to assist Balmaceda, he probably footed the bill; and there is good authority for stating that he did that for many of Mr. Egan's official messages. At that time also the Transandine was the only available cable route. In June, when the Central & South American Telegraph Co. wanted concessions to enable them to extend a line across the Andes, Balmaceda too was in want of a direct line to Callao. Mr. Egan therefore informs the State Department that "*the Chilian Government cannot be expected to grant the favors referred to in telegram of 17th, since the Telegraph Co. has refused to open direct communication with Valparaiso.*" Later on, the suggestion on Balmaceda's behalf becomes imperative, and "*Mr. Egan strongly recommends that the Telegraph Co. accept the offer made by the Chilian Government to pay the expenses of opening communication with Valparaiso and to give guarantees against damages to cable.*" Thus it was, that with the *Baltimore* to watch the splicing, on Mr. Egan's suggestion and recommendation, Balmaceda, secured a line of military importance for transmitting news of the enemy's movements, while the Congressional Party was thereby cut off from communication with the outside world.

There is one item with reference to Mr. Egan, which merits elucidation. Among other telegrams that were published in "*EL HERALDO,*" of Valparaiso, is to be found the following: "W. S. Stern, August 20th., 91.—Private — Communicate the following to Egan — *Nassaco* request us to telegraph you as follows: If you want assistance follow up the clue I have given as per my telegram of the 6th day of June, signed — *Habeas.*" The authenticity of this is acknowledged in a communication to the same paper from Mr. Stern, who received the cable from *Habeas*, Flint & Co. of New-York. It says: "Any one who is interested to learn the explanation of my cablegrams published yesterday in your paper, may pass to my office where he can receive the necessary details". Flint & Co. were Balmaceda's New York agents. What was their business with the U. S. Minister? What assistance could he derive or require from them? Who was "*Nassaco*" who chose Balmaceda's agents to cable Mr. Egan, and that clandestinely through W. S. Stern? What was the clue? Was not the cable to Mr. Egan really for Balmaceda? Quien sabe!

Picture to yourself the feelings of the U. S. Minister after the disastrous routs of Concon and Placilla. How must his pride have suffered in the complete overthrow of all his prognostications as to the outcome of the contest! What a sorry picture he made as a diplomatist who ought to have kept his Government informed as to the true state of affairs! Where had vanished the luring of "closer commercial relations"? The North and South

American Construction Co's claim of five million dollars, which his son was to have represented, with a power of attorney from the defunct Company which never had a cent of capital, disappeared in smoke. Cherished plans for getting ahead of, and venting his spleen on, the English were crushed to earth. Was a Minister in such a plight a fit representative of American interests? Could his feelings toward those who caused such downfall be friendly? Viewed thus in its true light there is explanation of his attitude as an obstructionist. On his part there was not the slightest effort to lessen the difficulties of those bearing the responsibility of the re-establishment of law and order. Refugees were in hiding in the U. S. Legation in Santiago, men who had been most active and unscrupulous during the eight months reign of tyranny, cruelty and unspeakable outrage. In a few days it was known that Colonel Vidaurre, a prominent and much desired person because of his complicity in the terrible Lo Cañas massacre of young boys, had, under the guise of a drunken U. S. seaman, got away safely on board the *San Francisco*. Hence the Legation was watched, not to offend Mr. Egan the Minister, whose methods they actually feared; but in order to prevent the escape of criminals then in safety under the stars and stripes, since escape in such garb could only have been made with the connivance and co-operation of the Minister himself. The Government was dealing with pressing needs, of providing for the wounded, of dissolving the organized forces belonging to both parties, of changing governors, of meeting financial questions of extreme urgency; and Mr. Egan begins to harrass with diplomatic notes about safe conduct. He falsely leads his Government to feel that the representatives of other nations receive safe conducts which are not granted to him. He assumes a persistent determination to look upon the refusal to grant his requests as intended to manifest "slight courtesy and consideration" for his Government; and induces the Washington authorities to accept his suggestion. While notes are constantly being interchanged about disrespect to the Legation, and the right to demand safe conduct for refugees, the *Baltimore* incident unfortunately arises. Mr. Egan was in the mood to make the most of it, and did. Captain Schley at once reported the facts to Mr. Egan and added, "*the origin of the difficulty I do not yet know*, but I have addressed a note to the Intendente requesting the fullest investigation in order to establish the proper culpability." Mr. Egan received this, and immediately cabled, adding of course the lie which aroused the United States Government, precipitated the *Baltimore* inquiry and all that followed. He telegraphed, "so far Captain Schley has not ascertained the causes which led to the disturbance, *but the general impression is that the attack was unprovoked and premeditated.*" This unmiti-

gated lie is the origin of all your difficulty with Chili. It arose from the venom of a heart that loved duplicity, as has been abundantly shown, and was filled with disappointment and bitter hatred.

Attention is now asked to another United States official also deeply involved in the late international strain. That Consul Mc. Creery engaged in exchange speculations is well known in Valparaiso, and the New York World of May 16th gave your public convincing proof of the same. He undoubtedly drew his salary as U. S. Consul, but his real business was on Calle Prat, the Wall Street of Valparaiso. At almost any hour of the day he was to be found there consulting with or giving orders to brokers to buy or sell for him. As a break in the seriousness of this writing one recalls and cannot help relating the Consul's morning salutation to a broker, as overheard by a passer by: "Well! how's your health this morning Mr.—?" "Firm at 17 $\frac{3}{4}$, with no buyers, thank you!" This gentleman evidently knew the Consul, whose only thought was of exchange and how to increase his bank-account by buying and selling Bills on London. To show that this was no child's play, it need only be remarked that while he employed several brokers to do his business, the following is a correct list of a part of his transactions with one broker during a little more than two months.

AS SELLER		AS BUYER.	
Jan. 27, 91	£ 7,000.	Jan. 28th	£ 5,000.
" 31	2,000.	" 30th	5,000.
" "	2,000.	Feb. 5th	8,000.
Feb. 2nd	2,000.	" 7th	10,000.
" 3rd	10,000.	" 11th	2,000.
" 7th	7,000.	" 20th	5,000.
" 12th	5,000.	" "	5,000.
" 17th	2,000.	" 21st	3,000.
" "	3,000.	" "	5,000.
" "	1,000.	" 24th	5,000.
" "	3,000.	" 25th	10,000.
" 19th	7,000.	Mar. 4th	10,000.
" 26th	10,000.	" 5th	5,000.
" 27th	5,000.	" "	3,000.
Mar. 2nd	5,000.	" "	7,000.
" 6th	9,000.	" 7th	10,000.
" 7th	16,000.	" 9th	5,000.
" 20th	11,000.	" 10th	6,000.
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Carried forward... 107,000.		103,000.	






Valparaiso August 20th 1891

Nº DEL DESPACHO	PREFIO	FECHA	HORA	TASA PARA LA COMPAÑIA.....
	PALABRAS	TRANSMITIDO POR MI	H. M.	A DESEMBOLSAR.....
			H. M.	TOTAL.....

Enviado por Lieutenant George Dyer
 Nombre, New York Herald
 Direccion United States
 Dirigido á

INSURGENTS	landed	moving	Quinteros	eight
Transports	three	trugs	four	warships
about	eight	thousand	Government	sent
force	Battle	imminent	Admiral	Brown
BROWN	Saw	landing	Flagship	San Francisco
Baltimore	Valparaiso	Esmeralda	off	harbor
Quiet	here			

CONDICIONES

La Compañía se reserva el derecho de rechazar un telegrama aún después de haberlo hecho cargo de su trasmision, pero en tal caso devolverá al expedidor la cantidad que satisfizo para su trasmision. Si un telegrama no llega a su destino por consecuencia de descuido ó negligencia de la Compañía ó de sus empleados mientras que el telegrama se hallaba á su cargo, se devolverá al expedidor la cantidad que hubiese satisfecho para su trasmision. Sin perjuicio de la devolución de lo que se hace mérito en la cláusula que antecede, la Compañía no responderá de las pérdidas daños ó perjuicios resultantes de la falta de trasmision, ó entrega de un telegrama, cuando el expedidor no se haya asegurado por motivo de la trasmision sea la causa que haya sido absolutamente desde el momento en que la comite en cualquier punto de su tránsito á otra red, servicio, ó línea telegráfica, que sea de propiedad ó bajo la direccion de cualquiera empresa ó autoridad que no esté subordinada exclusivamente á la Compañía, reservándose al efecto el mas amplio poder, aun cuando el servicio de aquella se haga en todo ó en parte, en conexcion con el de esta.

Sevase transmitir el telegrama arriba, de conformidad con las Condiciones precedentes, á las cuales consento en asentarme.
 Firma del Expedidor..... George Dyer..... Domicilio..... St. George's San Francisco

NOTE.—As this and the cipher telegram are only reproduced indirectly from photos and plates, the pencil details and Company stamp do not appear.

Valparaiso Feby 11th 1892.
Messrs Aschelmans & Isenell
Valparaiso.
Gents

I have your statement
showing a balance due me
January 30th 1892 of \$1870¹⁶/₁₀₀ and
I desire to inform you that
if the amount is not paid
to me by twelve o'clock noon
next Saturday (the 13th) legal
steps will be taken to enforce
collection of the same
Very Respect
Wm A W. C. C. C.





AL BANCO COMERCIAL DE CHILE

794 N. 004

Labaraso, Apóstol 1891
Paguese a N. S. Stern
Deposito

Al Portador
M. S. Stern
M. S. Stern

NOTA. Si no se borran las palabras "O AL PORTADOR" se pagará este cheque al que lo presente para su cargo sin necesidad de endoso.

Recd of Zumballa Bros Loro
thousand pesos - Aug 18th 1891 -
W. S. Stern
per mrm



Nº 65

SERIE

4488

1/4

DE 1891

AL BANCO NACIONAL DE CHILE,
VALPARAISO

PAGUESE A *J. W. B. de Bruyn*
O AL PORTADOR

LA SUMA DE *dos mil ochocientos y ochenta y cinco pesos 95 ch.*

\$ 2808-95 ch

3 *Laval de Keldmann*

NOTA - SI NO SE BORRAN LAS PALABRAS O AL PORTADOR SE PAGARA ESTE CHEQUE AL QUE LO PRESENTE PARA SU VALOR EN NECESIDAD DE ENDOSO Y CUANDO SE BORREN DICHAS PALABRAS SE PAGARA SOLAMENTE A LA PERSONA A FAVOR DE QUIEN ESTE JUNTO A SU BANCO.



Nº 79

SERIE

4488

29/4

DE 1891

AL BANCO NACIONAL DE CHILE,
VALPARAISO

PAGUESE A *J. W. B. de Bruyn*
O AL PORTADOR

LA SUMA DE *cinco mil setecientos y cuarenta y cuatro pesos 44 ch.*

\$ 5764-44 ch

3 *Laval de Keldmann*

CANCELADO

NOTA - SI NO SE BORRAN LAS PALABRAS O AL PORTADOR SE PAGARA ESTE CHEQUE AL QUE LO PRESENTE PARA SU VALOR EN NECESIDAD DE ENDOSO Y CUANDO SE BORREN DICHAS PALABRAS SE PAGARA SOLAMENTE A LA PERSONA A FAVOR DE QUIEN ESTE JUNTO A SU BANCO.



Nº 42

SERIE

4163

15/4

DE 1891

AL BANCO NACIONAL DE CHILE,
VALPARAISO

PAGUESE A *J. W. B. de Bruyn*
O AL PORTADOR

LA SUMA DE *once mil ochocientos treinta y tres pesos 93 ch.*

\$ 11733-93 ch

3 *Laval de Keldmann*

CANCELADO

NOTA - SI NO SE BORRAN LAS PALABRAS O AL PORTADOR SE PAGARA ESTE CHEQUE AL QUE LO PRESENTE PARA SU VALOR EN NECESIDAD DE ENDOSO Y CUANDO SE BORREN DICHAS PALABRAS SE PAGARA SOLAMENTE A LA PERSONA A FAVOR DE QUIEN ESTE JUNTO A SU BANCO.





MEMORANDUM

DE

NECKELMANN & ISENSEE

CALLE PRAT, 55

Valparaiso,

8 Enero de 1892

A Señor

Wm B. McCreery

COMPRADOR

Hemos comprado por su orden y cuenta £ 4000 = al cambio

de 21 ³/₈ peniques en letras a 90 d/p. sobre Londres:

de 1^o clase para 30 Enero 1892

V. B. del comprador.

Wm B. McCreery


He comprado por su orden y cuenta £ 5000 al cambio

de 22 ³/₈ peniques en letras a 90 d/p. sobre Londres

de 1^a para 10 Dic/90

V. B. =

Wm B. McCreery
vendedor




He comprado por su orden y cuenta £ 5.000 al cambio

de 22 ³/₈ peniques en letras a 90 d/p. sobre Londres

de 1^a para 7 Enero/91

V. B. =

Wm B. McCreery
vendedor



"VIA GALVESTON." THE CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN TELEGRAPH CO.

ESTACION DE

18


Nº DEL DESPACHO	PREFIJO	FECHA	HORA		TASA PARA LA COMPANIA.....
			H.	M.	A DESEMBOLSAR.....
PALABRAS	TRASMITIDO POR MI		H.	M.	TOTAL.....
					70

Enviado por _____

Nombre, _____ **SECNAV**

Dirección _____ **WASHINGTON**

Dirigido á _____

ABRIDERO	INFLECTIVE	CINTARAJD	ARBOLLON	REDEMISED
LAUFWERK	ABOLETANDO	INESCABAM	PORDIOSERO	OVERBOILED
BARLOAIS	GARRUCHA			
		BROWN		

La Compañia se reserva el derecho de rechazar un telegrama aún despues de haberse hecho cargo de su transmisión, pero en tal caso devolverá al expedidor la cantidad que satisfizo para su transmisión. Si una diligencia de cualquier naturaleza que impida que el telegrama se halla, á su cargo, se devuelve al expedidor, el telegrama se devuelve al expedidor en el caso que se hace mérito en la cláusula que precede, pero el expedidor se responsabiliza de las pérdidas daños ó perjuicios resultantes de la falta de transmisión ó entrega de un telegrama, ó de retraso ó error que se verifique en la transmisión ó entrega del mismo, cualquiera sea la causa que haya motivado tal falta de transmisión ó de entrega, atraso ó error. Para el efecto de estas condiciones la responsabilidad de la Compañia por motivo de la transmisión de un telegrama cesará en el momento en que el mismo sea entregado al destinatario, ó al propietario de la propiedad ó bajo la dirección directa de éste, ó al agente autorizado por escrito para tal efecto, ó al agente de la Compañia, reservándose al efecto el más amplio poder, aún cuando el servicio de aquélla se haga en todo ó en parte, en conexión con él de esta.

Siervase transmitir el telegrama arriba, de conformidad con las Condiciones precedentes, á las cuales consiente en someterse.....
 Firma del Expedidor, *George W. Brown* Domicilio, *San Francisco*



AS SELLER		AS BUYER	
<i>Brought forward</i>	£ 107,000.		£ 103,000
Mar. 31th	2,000.	Mar. 13th	5,000.
Apl. 1st	5,000.	Apl. 1st	2,000.
„ 4th	10,000.	„ „	1,000.
„ 6th	3,000.	„ 2nd	5,000.
„ 7th	3,000.	„ 7th	2,000.
„ 8th	2,000.	„ 8th	2,000.
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	£ 132,000.		£ 120,000.
	<hr/>		<hr/>

An aggregate of £ 252,000 between January 27th, 1891 and April 8th, 1891; and that, when my informant from whose books the above was copied by me, assured me that it did not include sales and purchases made for quick delivery, as often happened when important news reached the Consul. Allowing for these, and supposing the same rate to have continued as it undoubtedly did, the U. S. Consul's exchange transactions for the year 1891 do not fall below £ 2,000,000 Stg. which represents in Chilian currency at least \$ 25,000,000. With reason, some would even place the amount at twice these figures.

These extensive transactions were made by one who had no financial backing. Had they not been in the main successful they could not have been continued. Wherein lay the surety of the business? Is it likely that the Consul went into these vast negotiations singlehanded? Who is most likely to have been that wary silent partner?

It was patent to everybody that Balmaceda's even temporary success or advantage depressed the market, for he represented the suppression of everything honest and fair, the abolition of a free untrammelled press, the substitution of law by personal power and greed, the wanton expenditure of money, the fraudulent issue of paper money, the depression of credit, *the lowering of exchange*. On the other hand, every gain made by the Congressionalists, who recognized the rights of property, who represented order and the Constitution, who aimed to keep down expenses, to maintain the Nation's external credit unimpaired, to give security to persons, property and business,—every gain made by them naturally increased public confidence *and raised exchange*. This established and apparent, it was easy and safe to buy or sell as the case required, if one could only receive early news of what had happened. The Consul was our best source of information during the Revolution. From Mr. Egan, the friend at court, he daily received communications by letter and telephone; and unwonted activity on the Consul's part in the Exchange market invariably betokened

news favorable or unfavorable to the Congressional arms, according as he was unloading or covering himself. Mr. Egan was Balmaceda's right hand man. He was in close political intimacy with the Dictator, and had his confidence in matters transpiring in the North, and was continually imparting to the Consul the news which so decidedly affected exchange. Was he disinterested in thus providing the Consul with the means for doing a perfectly safe business? Does a Minister usually find it imperative to keep up so constant a correspondence with his Consul? Besides, the fact of Consul Mc.Creery's speculations was public talk. It could not have failed to reach the ear of Minister Egan. Did he reprimand him, or did he communicate that information to the State Department? Or, cognizant of the fact, was silence purchased by an interest in these transactions?

It was the combined forces which undoubtedly rendered the Calle Prat business so secure and remunerative, and it was by reason of their official capacity as representatives of the U. S. that Consul Mc.Creery found his great advantage over speculators and mercantile houses needing Bills. During the earlier months of the Revolution, when important events were occurring in the North, Mr. Egan's news to the Consul was invaluable. He then made gains right along for every mail. From one broker proof has been sent to the U. S. showing that he received as profits,

February 18th 1891.....	\$ 11,735.93 (*)
March 4th „	2,014.70
„ 18th „	12,240.19
Abril 1st „	2,808.95
„ 18th „	1,864.04
„ 29th „	5,767.44
	<hr/>
Total gains	\$ 36,431.25

and that, despite his belief in the success of Balmaceda, which should have led him to always count on a lowering exchange.

After the definite occupation of Tarapacá by the Congressional forces, and the sinking of the *Blanco Encalada*, the news to go upon was not so abundant and things did not pay so well. For the European mail of May 13th, 1891, the Consul had purchased through one broker £ 31,000, in various amounts and rates, for \$ 463,797.44, which he had to sell for only \$ 453,834.80. Loss \$ 9,962.24. Mail, May 27th £ 12,000, purchased in various sums for \$ 185,995.51; sold out for \$ 174,313.26, costing him again \$ 11,682.25. Total loss in May, \$ 21,644.49. When the May 13th losses

(*) See appended photographs.

were looming up, the *Itata* appeared in San Diego. The Consul might effectively prevent her sailing with, or for the arms. The failure to procure arms and ammunition meant a prolongation of the war, greater expenditure of public funds, continued speculations on the part of Balma-
ceda's adherents, and consequently favored schemes based upon a depreciation in exchange. Here was an opportunity to assist Balma-
ceda, and these speculations and threatened losses made the temptation strong to do so. Results would be tangible; and so the Consul found it easy to go to the Intendencia, to be present while, under the pressure of existings things and knowledge that speedy imprisonment would follow answers that were not desired, the managers of the South American S. S. Co. were asked a few pertinent questions. Then and there the Consul signed in ink a despatch, drawn up in leadpencil, and addressed to Secretary Blaine. He need trouble himself about the matter no farther than to sign as U. S. Consul. That official message published in the red book as from the "U. S. Consulate" came from the Governor's despatching office. The original in the Trasandine office is not in the Consul's handwriting, nor in that of his secretary, and the expense of its transmission was met by Intendente Viel, as the original bears undeniable evidence,—that is, an official message to the U. S. Government paid for with money which had been stolen from the people of Chili.

And to what length the dollar will lead one! On May 27th, through the failure of a heavy speculator, Señor Manuel Ramos, in consequence of a sudden variation in exchange, a £ 5,000 bill sold to him by Mr. Neckelmann on the Consul's account, came back on the latter and made him drop \$ 7,400. Mr. Neckelmann's books conclusively prove the truth of his statements; but having failed to secure Mr. Mc. Creery's signature, for he was then keeping in the back ground as much as possible, he has no redress at law, since legally the signature is the only evidence of such transactions. Mr. Neckelmann asserts that the Consul promised to, but never paid this. After that, photographic proof of which was sent, Mr. N. did business; but, no longer trusting the word of the U. S. Consul, he got him to sign and leave the slip in his broker's possession. Later, when one transaction netted a gain of \$ 1870, Mr. Neckelman kept the amount as against the \$ 7,400, and sent a statement to that effect. This called out the Consul's threat which was also reproduced in the "WORLD". To fill out this point it need only be mentioned that I saw in the Banco Nacional a receipt which the Consul had given, for a cheque of his dated May 21st, to order of Mr. Nekelmann, for \$ 7,416, and which he was showing to friends to prove that it was payment of the above, forgetting evidently

that the transaction closed only on May 27th, and would hardly have been anticipated. It was at this same time that anxiety about public reports led him to read several people a letter, which he said was "from the Department," or "from Mr. Curtis", and which he claimed gave authority for his speculation.

When the Congressional fleet gave the signal that within 40 hours a landing would be effected, business ceased. The consul was heavily loaded for he was expecting that it would take months after receipt of arms before an organized force could come down; and so, he was vainly trying to unload. His anxious hurrying about was frequently commented upon. When the *San Francisco* went out to Quinteros and brought back reliable news about the military movements, the Consul was at the landing awaiting her return. He went off in the captain of the port's boat. That boat brought back the news of the landing. The Consul returned with the ship's officer to shore; and there are two parties to whom it can be proven that he imparted the *San Francisco's* news; and it is impossible to convince those who were witnesses of his anxious hurrying about, that, in view of the personal consequences to himself, he could resist the temptation to see that the news reached those who were most vitally concerned.

Barbosa and Alcerreca, the division general failed to make the most of the definite information got by the *San Francisco*. They were terribly routed in Concon. The attacking force manœuvred; on August 28th was behind the city; gave battle and entered Valparaiso, that afternoon, in triumph and amid general rejoicings. Balmaceda's egg shell broke. He sought safety in concealment, and the war was at an end. Confidence was restored, business resumed, and exchange went up from 17 to 19 pence on the Dollar. Some were badly nipped on the exchange market, and among them the United States Consul.

Then comes October 16th. when Captain Schley landed 117 men. Consul Mc. Creery recognizing the public feeling and, perhaps, privately recognizing too the justice of the resentment had advised that the men be kept on board. They landed however. There was bitter feeling on both sides. The result is well known. In a street row two American seamen were killed, and a number wounded. The U. S. officials here resident saw the chance of possible complications tending to affect exchange, and to recover what had been lost, or was still at stake. The Consul, most directly chargeable with these intentions, lost no opportunity of painting the affair in blood red colors. To me he spoke as follows: "By what right of international law, I'd like to know, can German and English sailors come on shore and ours not? If this Government cannot guarantee us

protection, why we'll come down and establish one that will. *They have had their Star Chamber to whitewash their men, but we have also had ours.* We have spent \$ 4000 cabling our report, and now it rests with the Cabinet to say what shall be done. It is an international question. I tell you Chili is over a volcano, and if she is not careful she will be wiped off the face of the earth." There are other persons to whom he said practically the same thing, and one gentleman informed me that the same afternoon the Consul had said to him, "We have sent home our report, and you will find that every hill side will bristle with men as it did when Fort Sumter was fired on, *and exchange will drop to six pence.*"

It fell in with the Consul's plans to have exchange go down, and by his warlike talk, he certainly did all in his power to bear down the market. That in all this he was not truthful and honest calls for but one proof. On October 16th, Consul Mc. Creery was not in Valparaiso. He was absent in the North, having gone to Iquique to arrange, it was said, about some mines belonging to Mr. Mackenna, then living in Mr. Egan's house. Had he sought to do only what was right, would he not have replied to Mr. Blaine's note: "Give me all the facts you have and all the information you can get relative to the riot," that through absence he could only repeat what he learned on board the *Baltimore*? Instead of that, he sends what is practically a duplicate of the inquiry which he himself had acknowledged was a one sided, garbled, Star Chamber report; and thus falsely led the Washington authorities to feel that here was corroborative evidence.

Consul Mc. Creery's eagerness to catch hold of any pretext to embroil matters is evinced by his conduct in connection with the Patrick Shields and Carl Carlsen claims. About the former much might be said. Let it suffice to mention a few particulars. Shields had already been reported as a deserter at the Consulate by the Captain of the S. S. *Keweenaw*. Legally therefore he was no longer entitled to U. S. Consulate protection. But supposing he had been, is not the following enough to stamp the whole affair? Consul Mc. Creery, as can be seen from the testimony on page 626 of red book, went on board, remained all night, and took Patrick Shields' statement. Do you wish to know why it was necessary for the vice consul to take a second declaration, which was signed by Shields? After the Consul had the fireman's statement, he read it to a gentleman, on shore, who called his attention to the fact that the declaration he had made out stated that Patrick Shields was a U. S. citizen, whereas he had seen the ship's roll on which he was entered as a subject of Great Britain. Thereupon the Consul went to Santiago and consulted with Mr. Egan.

The result was, that that declaration disappeared and the vice consul had to be ordered to take another.

With regard to the Carlsen claims, only one item. When asked by the authorities to name his witnesses, the Consul gave in two names. In my rounds, a call was made on one of them to learn the facts of the case. All he could say was that he saw the man lying in an alley-way groaning; but he informed me, on cross questioning—for the trend of events had long before aroused my suspicions as to the game that was being played—that before reporting his name as a witness, the Consul had twice called to converse with him at length, and later on, in the Consulate, had *read him the statement of the wounded man.*

When President Harrison's "ultimatum" was confidently expected by the U. S. officials here, the Consul was actively preparing his exchange ventures for such a document. One photographic slip of exchange purchase has been obtained as proof. When the bellicose message arrived, the Consul publicly asserted that they "would make Chili eat mud". He pictured inevitable war. He longed for it. He did his best to create a panic in the exchange market, and was reported on our Wall Street to have very successfully unloaded £ 40,000.

That Consul Mc. Creery used his official position to make money by hook or crook is also shown from the fact that he received money for despatching food products, then contraband, to the North, on American and other vessels, for Italian mercantile houses. Under the date, August 19th, on the right hand page of Zanelli Brothers' books, I have myself seen the entry of payment of \$ 2,000 made to "Consul Americano embarques *Chili Arica*"; and also the stub, showing check drawn to order of "W. S. Stern on account of C. A." (Consul Americano); and also the receipt for it, kept in an envelope marked "American Consul" and signed "W. S. Stern p. W. B. M.". (*) There is another witness to this.

There is a firm in town which paid ten thousand dollars to Consul Mc. Creery for services which he and Mr. Egan rendered in despatching the American vessel "Willard Mudgett" for Montevideo loaded with provisions. Mr. Egan could not or would not obtain her despatch, which as U. S. Minister he should have done, until, so I have been told by the head of the firm, who himself made the payment, he *sent word* that all could be arranged for \$ 10,000.

These are the men who sought, as they would have the public believe,

(*) See appendix for documentary of this, which has since been obtained.

with imminent risk to their persons and lives, to maintain the dignity of the nation and the honor of the flag. Will the people of the great republic allow themselves to be hoodwinked? Will they fail to see the tremendous pressure brought to bear upon these officials to misrepresent, exaggerate and force matters to a crisis in order to gratify undying hatred and to secure a family fortune, or save themselves from financial ruin? Can they be blind to the imputations which the transactions and methods disclosed cast upon the veracity of these heroes? Will they credit the smooth words and affable ways of him whom years of training and natural aptitude for intrigue have taught to use others to draw the chesnuts out of the fire, while he remains safely in the background and leaves nothing but "verbal communications"? And finally, can they place the slightest confidence in the "cats paw" of this disgraceful affair, who repeatedly since last April, and until public proofs were given, assured a friend, "I swear to God I have not touched a penny in exchange."

And must this shameful but truthful exposure be continued in order to vindicate Chili, and remove the unjust and unjustifiable feelings towards her, which in January last, so stirred the American people? Your readiness to stand by the flag and shelter the men who sail under it, would have been worthy of admiration but for the partisanship, the duplicity and the intrigue which underlay all that moved your patriotism.

When the U. S. cruisers appeared in these waters, it was only natural that their Commanders should look to the Minister and Consul for reliable views of the situation. Had the naval officers known these gentlemen, as we came to know them, your Navy and Government would never have been led into the false position which they assumed. The premises given them were false, and naturally they were mistaken in their deductions. They were duped by shrewd intriguing Mr. Egan; and biased by the grasping Mr. Mc. Creery, who in furtherance of his money making schemes once took a broker to the U. S. Consulate and there had Patrick Shields strip and show his back, in order that his bruises might be used to show the basis of a new claim and possible complications, and so affect exchange.

Still the naval officers have some responsibility in connection with the late embargo. The cable cutting incident, which was done under the supervision of the *Baltimore*, is mentioned merely because it served to deepen feelings of resentment toward the American Government and navy. The *Baltimore* only obeyed orders, and the U. S. Government only accepted the suggestion of the wily minister; but it cannot be denied that in the course followed, decided advantages accrued to Balmaceda, while the Congressionalists were placed at a corresponding disadvantage.

Whether the U. S. Government in protecting American interests was justified in going the length it did, is not for me to call in question. Attention is simply drawn to what its course really accomplished. It gave Balmaceda another prop, while it weakened the Opposition, and so caused enmity in the people of Chili.

The chase of the *Itata* was ludicrous and painfully belittling to a great Nation. A Congressional transport had gone into San Diego for coals and provisions. Her mission on your coast was to receive and transport arms, not to be fitted out as an armed vessel. This being known, the *Itata's* arrest, was made by an officer who at first could show no papers of arrest, but only those guaranteeing him to be an authorized U. S. Marshall. The Marshall's deputy on board had never been sworn in as such, and was merely a detective in Balmaceda's employ, through Flint & Co. of New York. On the strength no doubt of Consul Mc. Cree-ry's cable, which has been mentioned, the Washington authorities sent orders for all the *Itata's* men to be landed without payment of wages, and for the detention of the vessel, awaiting instructions from the South American Steam Ship Co., or Balmaceda, for his wishes at that time had to be gratified, or arrest, imprisonment and banishment were the consequences. Captain Mannzen knew what the failure of his mission would mean. He sailed out of port without any clearance papers, while under an arrest which was only made out in legal form on July 8th. after her return. For the crime of running away thus, when no authorized U. S. officer was on board, Secretary Tracy ordered out a U. S. cruiser to bring back the recreant. The *Charleston*, with flourish of trumpets, was sent out to give chase, and the *Itata* ultimately taken back when, simply to avoid difficulties, which the Junta felt were brewing, the vessel was handed over with arms which had not been taken aboard in San Diego, as they were led to believe. She had to be surrendered to superior force. The U. S. Government took her from Chilian waters, which was of itself a breach of international law; and these measures, of forcibly taking a simple transport, were resorted to, when by your own court finding there was not a single point on which the *Itata* could be held, or the Congressional agents found guilty of having violated any neutrality laws.

In the North, the Congressional Party was without arms. Had Balmaceda suspected the plight in which it was, by continuing to send forces he could shortly have exhausted their resources and have won an easy victory. The night mare which the leaders there had to face for months was this lack of arms and ammunition; and when these were finally in Iquique on board the runaway *Itata*, you can understand how their

blood would boil to see her compelled to sail away, escorted by the *Charleston*, on such flimsy pretences, and realize once more that they were utterly helpless to make even a pretence at fighting. When you realize all this, however it be gilded over, it was unbecoming in the United States, and a flagrant interference in Balmaceda's behalf. Why the U. S. Government was so strenuous to thwart the Congressional plans can only, it seems to me, be due to misconceptions and unjust prejudices under which it labored through having Messrs. Egan and Mc. Creery in Chili.

Hitherto the U. S. Navy was obeying orders; but not so in Admiral Brown's trip to Quinteros. There the naval officer assumed the responsibility of his action, though even in that, Mr. Egan was probably the suggestor of the trip. On the morning of Aug. 20th, 1891, Valparaiso's expectancy came to a height when it became known that a landing of Opposition troops was taking place in Quinteros Bay, 20 miles to the North of Valparaiso. The excitement was intense, the Dictatorial forces were astir, trains were whistling and running about, troops gathered and some were sent out by the railroad line to the North. Three of the transports had however been seen to sail across the mouth of the Bay toward the South; and rumors began to fly about that the Opposition forces were also landing to the South of the city. The civil and military authorities did not know what to do. Trains were kept in readiness but the troops were sent back to their quarters. *Everything was indecision because of the lack of reliable news as to whether the Quinteros landing were genuine or a mere feint.*

When Intendente Viel was in this predicament, the *San Francisco* went out to Quinteros. At 5 P. M. she returned, and immediately an officer landed and went straight to the Intendencia. When that officer left the Governor's office, the indecision, so pronounced before, disappeared. All was then bustle and confusion, messengers were hurried here and there, troops marched down again to the railroad stations, boarded the trains which had been standing idle all day, and between seven and eight in the evening went out of town, leaving only one regiment, the Limache, to guard the city. Naturally Admiral Brown, in his "distinct denial of the odious charges" that he brought back "most important information to the Government authorities at Valparaiso", seeks to make out that everything was known on shore. This is not so. Listen to what Admiral Valois of the German Navy wrote to the Admiralty Office in Berlin, under date of August 20th. He says:—"On the morning of the 20th, it was rumored throughout the city that Congressional forces had landed in Quinteros; and Admiral Brown sent his flag lieutenant to advise me that he thought of going there for the purpose of acquainting himself with the actual state of affairs. I went on

board the *San Francisco* to learn further details. I told Admiral Brown that I did not deem it prudent to go to a point where a landing was being effected, since this would lend itself to false interpretations, and because in all circumstances the presence of the vessels here was more essential. I then went on shore. The Intendente, Vice Admiral Viel, communicated to me the following: at day break, the Congressional fleet had entered Quinteros Bay, and at 7 a.m. the landing began. Admiral Viel could not give me any data as to the force of the enemy: but on the other hand said that by the 22nd, at the latest, 15,000 men belonging to the Government army would be collected in the vicinity of Quinteros. *In Valparaiso a garrison of 3,000 more men remained. It was also thought possible that a portion of the Congressional forces might disembark to the South of Valparaiso.*" This extract from the German Admiral's report will serve to prove what every one here knew, viz:— that even after Admiral Brown left the harbor, the authorities did not know the force of the enemy, nor whether the landing was effective, nor whether the attack might not eventually come from the South; but no sooner had Admiral Brown's flag lieutenant been to the Intendencia and given the result of the *San Francisco's* observations than the whole aspect changed, for the Dictators supporters then knew what to expect, and sent out all the men they could possibly spare. The garrison of 3,000 was reduced to 500 solely on the strength of the *San Francisco's* news. Admiral Brown would have it believed that "full information about landing was known at Santiago and Valparaiso before I sailed at noon". No one ever denied that. It was known that a landing was being made at Quinteros. The doubt was, as to whether it was effective or a blind; and Admiral Brown's trip to the North removed that doubt. He further telegraphed that "no one from this ship gave information". Could he say that now, after the writer made public the photograph of Lieutenant Dyer's telegram, bearing the signature of "O. Viel" the Intendente of Valparaiso? Chilians, and every one who saw what transpired on the return of the *San Francisco*, felt convinced that she brought and gave the authorities the news. The Government paper distinctly stated next A. M. that "though the courtesy of the officers of this U. S. vessel reliable information as to the movements of the fleet had been obtained;" yet months elapsed before undeniable proof was forthcoming to show that this was so. Unfortunately for Admiral Brown it proves that his own private secretary was the man to communicate what was not "in the line of the strictest neutrality". He says, "I did not communicate with these ships (those on picket duty) nor with any one at Quinteros, because I knew if I did so that it would be said in Valparaiso that I had

given information to the Congressionalists"; yet, on reaching the harbor, the Consul whose money interests were great was allowed to board the *San Francisco* and receive the news which he gave out publicly, while Lieutenant Dyer, if not by word of mouth, just as surely told Admiral Viel all that he wished or needed to know.

Consider for a moment the consequences that resulted therefrom. Balmaceda had known for several days that Valparaiso was the objective point of attack. He had therefore ordered the troops from Concepcion, even before the landing began, and had warned his division generals to be prepared, though he acknowledged that he could not say whether the attack would come from the North or South of this sea port. In the desire to hold Valparaiso 3,000 men were being kept as a garrison to provide against unforeseen attack. After the, for them, opportune errand of the *San Francisco*, these men and those hastening down from Santiago were massed at Concon, and a force of 11,000 men opposed the advance of the Congressionalists at the Aconcagua River. The attacking party with difficulty carried the day against superior forces and natural disadvantages. Had it not been for the important information brought by the *San Francisco* the opposing force at the river would not have numbered 6,000, the victory would not have been so dearly bought, the Congressionalists would by the next day have had possession of the railroad line and Valparaiso would have fallen without a struggle. *The delay, which allowed troops to arrive even from Concepcion, was due to Lieutenant Dyer's breach of neutrality; and the necessity for a second battle, with its 1,460 killed and 2,500 wounded is plainly attributable to this act of a U. S. officer.*

Chilians generally recognized and felt all this. Do you wonder that they should have had bitter feelings towards the only navy whose acts in every instance assisted him who, though Mr. Egan's friend, was everywhere detested because he was clearly a proud, vain, unscrupulous and cruel tyrant?

When later troubles threatened Chili, the animus of the bulk of the naval officers was openly inimical to the victors in the civil struggle; but aside from the manifest tone which only tended to increase mutual feelings of dislike and distrust, there is one U. S. officer whose conduct merits disapproval and censure, because it is largely responsible for the false views which gained currency and acceptance in the United States regarding Chili, her rulers and her people. Lieutenant Harlow, who came here as an Attaché of the Legation in Santiago, in the interests of the Chicago Exposition, ostensibly to favor friendly relations between the two countries, was closely associated with the Egan-Mc. Creery clique.

While receiving attentions from the authorities, he was secretly sending cable despatches to N. Y. World which only tended to embroil the two countries in war. Under the name of "Reamer" he wired news whose false coloring and misrepresentation can have had no other purpose than to discredit Chili, ruin her good name, run down her credit, and threaten her relations with the United States. Lieutenant Harlow was an able assistant in Mr. Egan's intrigues. He influenced public feeling at home, while the U. S. Minister could touch the official strings at Washington, and the U.S. Consul did the real business on the Wall street of Valparaiso. They were in intimate and constant communication, and there exists evidence to show that Consul Mc. Creery himself wrote out cable despatches to the New York press, signing the name REAMER. Draw your own inferences.

It will be said that all this fails to touch the main point at issue—the murder of two U. S. seamen, and the stabbing of others, in the streets of Valparaiso. Attention is therefore asked to its consideration.

In view of what has been stated it will be admitted, no doubt, that justly or unjustly bad feeling existed toward the U. S. Government and Navy. The Consul had advised captain Schley to keep his men on board; and that the latter recognized the existence of ill feeling is shown by an extract from his telegram of Sept. 25th, 1891, to Secretary Tracy. In it he says: "and to avoid any difficulty between the men of the *Baltimore* and *Chilian* sailors, no liberty has been granted." If "strong feeling and great hostility among *Chilians* against American citizens" existed at that time, Mr. Egan's course in Santiago had in no wise tended to lessen that feeling. On the contrary it had only served to deepen it; and yet, without advising the authorities, on October 16th, captain Schley saw fit to give liberty to a third of his "tough crew," as the *Baltimore* officers themselves called them. On that day 117 men came on shore, when they anticipated trouble, as is admitted in the following sentence taken from President Harrison's message: "*the evidence of the ship's officer of the day is that even the jack knives of the men were taken from them before leaving the ship;*" and by the remarks of the *Baltimore* officers, who on landing by the one o'clock boat that afternoon, assured their friends there would be "some fun, as captain Schley has given liberty to 117 men, who are coming on shore boiling for a fight."

The feeling of hostility, which led them to anticipate trouble, they thus admitted was not all on one side. The American seamen were full of hatred toward the *Chilians*; and the parting injunction said to have been spoken in the hearing of the men, "one watch of my ship can go through Valparaiso," did not allay that feeling. Besides, parties on shore can be

referred to, who, overhearing some U. S. seamen chaffing a companion about cowardice in refusing to keep an appointment at the "Shakespeare," went up the hill claiming that "the Yankees are bound to have a row to night." Such was the material at hand. Among some *in a saloon* a row occurs; a Chilian is knocked down, and the cry goes out that an American sailor had killed a native. This happened in the worst section of the city, where disreputable crowds readily collect; and with the excited feelings which swayed both parties, it is no wonder that this spark lighted a blaze. Crowds of roughs *then* ran about looking for the American seamen. At one saloon in calle San Martin, kept by George Jackson, Turnbull was drinking. When the men came by they were told there were no Americans there, and Turnbull was advised to go into the back room and to remain there. This he refused to do, saying he wanted to go out "to fight." He could not be dissuaded from his purpose. He went out, the door was barred, and within a couple of minutes he came running back followed by an infuriated mob. Unable to enter, he was there stabbed, and then continued his flight until overcome. From his wounds this unfortunate man died; but be it remembered, that though in a place of safety, it was his own wish to enter into a fight that led him out of doors and to his death. Still, this is one of the men for whose death Chili was bulldozed into paying \$ 75,000 gold; and on such ground and such manifest untruths \$ 5,000,000 were taken from the U. S. Treasury to meet expenses of bristling up to support representatives, who, as you must yourselves now admit, were unworthy to represent the United States and her interests.

As the result of captain Schley's indiscretion, if not provocation, he had to report "that while a party of men from the *Baltimore* were ashore on liberty in Valparaiso, the previous afternoon, one of the boatswain's mates was killed and six men were seriously wounded;" while to compass his ends Mr. Egan sends the utterly false statement that "the general impression is that the attack was unprovoked and premeditated.

Throughout the whole correspondence about the *Baltimore* tragedy there is manifest untruth, and deliberate purpose to make it serve to disturb the relations between Chili and the United States. The attack was reported to have arisen simultaneously in widely separate parts of the city; whereas it was almost wholly confined to a portion not larger than the space occupied by one, or at most two blocks such as exist in New York. The delay of the police in reaching the point of disturbance was considered inexcusable, since it was falsely stated to be "only three minutes, walk from the police station;" whereas a "full half hour" for them

to have received word, turned out, and be upon the ground actually shows little or no delay. Bayonet stabs were considered as indisputable proof of police complicity in the assault; whereas it was well known that Tom, Dick and Harry had bayonets and muskets picked up on the battle field, or bartered away by Balmacedista soldiers for an old suit of clothes. The brutal but usual way of leading prisoners by catgut nippers was portrayed as showing deliberate cruelty in the treatment of seamen run off to the police station. And so forth.

Mr. Egan, nettled about the refusal to grant safe conducts to his friends in the Legation, seems to have at once sought the excuse for trouble, and on one sided evidence reports the assault as having been "brutal and unprovoked, and implicating the police as having participated in it." Official messages are passed, and the tone assumed is intentionally offensive, as witness. — "the sailors of the *Baltimore* were unarmed, were entirely correct and orderly in their conduct, gave no cause of provocation, that the attack was apparently premeditated, and that the assaults were made by armed men greatly superior in numbers, and who, as my Government must conclude, were animated in their bloody work by hostility to those men as sailors of the United States." Had he said "as I have led my Government to conclude," it would have been more appropriate; but in this, as in the sentences, "they were both deliberately fired upon by the police," "the police meantime either did not interfere to protect them, or joined in the attack," etc. can be seen the spirit which sought not only to offend, but to assume the functions of the Chilean criminal courts. He sought to have the legal procedure of the courts altered to suit his will and pleasure, and ever seeks to play the bully and compel a yielding on Chile's part by deceitful messages to his Government. The rights of sovereignty were ignored, the legitimate authority of the courts to judge criminal cases occurring in Chilean territory set aside. An attorney's plea is accepted as a jury's verdict.

Taking a dispassionate view of the whole subject, do you wonder that an American gentleman, speaking in my hearing of Señor Matta's circular, which spoke of intrigues and threats, and which he considered highly undiplomatic, yet said, "but it is God's truth every word of it?" The only possible explanation of the conduct of these men is that there were intrigues, to affect exchange, and to annoy, embarrass and humiliate Chile. Irregular procedure, as in the Shields and Carlsen claims, had to be availed of by your representatives; and, further than the pernicious contamination of the sentiments of the naval officers, pressure was likewise brought to bear on the press correspondents. When important news was no longer

obtainable to form the basis of exchange transactions, and when the rate could only be lowered by obstructing the processes of reorganization or by raising international difficulties, the press agents, with the single exception of the N. Y. HERALD'S correspondent, were won over to the official way of thinking. Whether intentional or not, one cannot say; but this almost deliberate purpose to twist events for the accomplishing of certain ends, manifested itself in countless ways: a barbarous state of civilization was pictured; the lives of U. S. officials and citizens were stated to be in imminent peril; repeated attempts to mob and burn the Legation were heralded forth; the *Baltimore* was reported as blown up by a torpedo; and so, etc., ad nauseam.

To alter Lowells noble sentiment to suit the occasion, it unfortunately looks as though in the case of U. S. officials in Chili, it has not been, "our Country, she shall never be wrong;" but rather, "our country, and our pocket, right or wrong." Throughout this civil war and its complications, Chili has been grievously misjudged and wronged; and your own country has been deceived, blinded, wronged and officially made to abett rascality. Is there not reason enough to affirm this, or can the American people be deaf to such circumstantial and supported charges against their official representatives here, and fail to raise indignant protest? That is hard to credit.

The officials who are here assailed must have seen the charges publicly made against them over the writer's signature. The Consul told me he had read the letter addressed to Congressman Breckenridge, and yet no steps have been taken by them to clear themselves. They have not had the manliness to ask for an investigation of the serious charges preferred, and which went accompanied by telling proof. They may therefore accept this as a public challenge defying them to give me, and the American citizens here resident, a chance to furnish proof, before an investigating committee sent to Valparaiso, as to the truth of the foregoing.



JOHN TRUMBULL.