Le survio la ofrecido

(le peque esté morcede ; hidraide).

United States Department of State




CHILE DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT

(Human Rights in Chile – Tranche 1)

Volume 3 of 29 (November 1973 – December 1973)

Authorized for Public Release June 1999

United States Department of State




CHILE DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT

(Human Rights in Chile – Tranche 1)

Annexes From Other Agencies: Department of Defense

For Public Release June 1999

UNCLASSIFIED







The File copy of this doc ant was forwarded to Department of State in accordance with FOI request of Latelier (State 153356 - copy ONLY retained)

ie R



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Santiago, Chile

March 11 1071

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Harry W. Shlaudeman, Esquire Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Department of State Washington

Dear Harry:

I appreciate your letter of March 4 with respect to human rights problems in Chile, and the possibility of raising the case of Orlando Letelier with Chilean leaders.

I understand fully the inhibiting effect the human rights problem has on your efforts in Washington to help the Chileans. Down here it is by all odds the most difficult subject with which we deal, and the one presenting the sharpest dilemma.

In meeting members of the Junta and Cabinet Ministers in courtesy calls, I have invariably taken the line that the U.S. Government is in sympathy with, and supports, the Government of Chile, but that our ability to be helpful to Chile is hampered by Congressional and media concerns in the United States with respect to alleged violations of human rights here.

I have not felt that at the outset I should go beyond this general statement. However, as I work my way into the job, I intend to do so. The attached memorandum includes my first reference to Letelier in an official conversation.

Before leaving Washington, Jack Kubisch and I discussed the proper approach on human rights matters. We agreed that on a personal basis I could quite appropriately raise questions with

GDS

UKCLASSIFIED

4.

UNCLASSIFIED

The File copy of this doc ent was forwarded to Department or State in accordance with FOI request of Letelier (State 153356 - copy ONLY retained)

< 7

regard to people like Letelier. I intend to do so, with increasing directness, in the weeks ahead. I will be feeling my way; I am sure you agree that if I push matters to the point of a sharp negative reaction, the exercise will be worse than useless.

Ø

The other side of the dilemma is that if we are too gentle, the Chileans will simply disregard our comments. In this connection, I am just now looking into what happens when we go to the Chilean Foreign Office to ask for information regarding Chilean nationals concerning whom members of Congress and American private citizens keep sending me communications. All too often the answer is complete silence, and we have no mechanism for follow up. I am turning over in my mind the possibility of asking General Bonilla, the Minister of Interior, whether we could not informally go straight to someone in his department, rather than make inquiries to an ill-informed Foreign Office official who is simply unable to help. Again, I will work into this one gradually but at some stage intend to give it a try.

I must apologize for not having written you sooner. I find the local situation absorbing, with elements of both hope and tragedy. Nothing looks quite as sharp and simple as it did before I arrived -- which is understandable enough.

I see two tasks as perhaps our biggest jobs here in the immediate future. The first is to deliver a reasonable amount of economic assistance to the Chileans, so that we can give them the material and even more the moral support they need and deserve from us. The second is to save these well-meaning but somewhat narrow and unimaginative military leaders (who virtually monopolize the top government structure) from the consequences of their own acts. All too often they simply fail to understand the consequences outside the country of some of their statements and positions. As you know, Chileans are sensitive and highly nationalistic people, and I have no illusions about how much influence any one of us can exercise on them. But to the extent that we can make a useful input, I surely intend to try.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,

David H. Popper

Ambassador



Chile Project	(#S19990	0006)	
U.S. Departm	ent of Sta	te	
_/Release	_Excise _	Deny_	<u>√</u> Declass
Exemption(s)			



MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING ARMS SALES TO CHILE


The following major considerations impact heavily on any proposed sale of weapons to Chile, regardless of the funding involved:

Human Rights. Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 states that it is the sense of Congress that no economic or military assistance should be given to governments which imprison persons for political purposes. The Section is a sense of the Congress provision rather than a mandatory prohibition; sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act, whether cash or credit, are not considered to be "assistance" as that term is used in the Foreign Assistance Act or related legislation. it is not a legal bar to sales under the FMSA. Nevertheless, Section 32 constitutes a recent expression of congressional concern over the treatment of political prisoners by governments which are recipients of aid from the United States; it is an expression of intent which should not be ignored. While Section 32 is not directly applicable here, Section 1 of the Foreign Military Sales Act contains further "sense of the Congress" language stating that sales and guaranties should not be approved "where they would have the effect of arming military dictators who are denying the growth of fundamental rights or social progress to their own people ... " This provision, although not automatically applicable, is relevant.

Section 35 of the Act refers specifically to Chile and calls on the President to seek GOC compliance with various human rights issues. We have already undertaken such steps with the GOC as are comtemplated in Section 35 and will continue to do so as appropriate.

We have repeatedly explained to the Chileans the serious problem we have in meeting the requests for military sales in light of congressional and public concern over GOC treatment of prisoners and other human rights issues. While GOC officials profess to understand the climate created in the United States over the human rights issue, they continue to submit new requests for military equipment and to press us for rapid approval.

b. Economic Considerations. Chile is a nation seeking to reschedule its massive external debt obligations in order to help resolve the economic chaos



UKCLASSIFIED

inherited from the Allende period. On economic grounds alone, the expenditure of large sums on arms acquisitions at a time when it is pleading its case for concessional . economic assistance and generous debt rescheduling is certain to further arouse Chile's critics in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere. The Foreign Military Sales Act specifically provides for a Presidential finding that a less developed country "is diverting its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures," a finding which has the effect of making that country ineligible for further sales and guaranties. Under Section 620 (s) of the FAA the President is required to take into account before furnishing development loans the extent to which a recipient country is devoting a high percentage of its budget and foreign exchange resources to military purposes or to the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems (see below). While neither of these provisions constitute a mandatory prohibition against foreign military sales or development assistance respectively, they indicate the concern of Congress with excessive military expenditures.


From an economic standpoint, the cost to the GOC of the recommended items would be relatively moderate in comparison with the total value of GOC request. Moreover, the GOC would appear to have valid security reasons for such expenditures in view of Peru's recent expansion of its military capabilities. The recommended sales would, in our view, help redress the present military imbalance between Chile and Peru without materially contributing to the possibility of an arms race developing between those two nations.

c. Sophisticated Weapons. Section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Conte-Long Amendment, prohibits credit sale of sophisticated weapons systems including missiles and jet military aircraft to all but a specified list of underdeveloped nations, none of which is in Latin America. A national security waiver was made by the President in May 1973 to permit the credit sale of the F-5E to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Peru was subsequently included. Sale of the A-7 would require either a similar finding by the President or an interdepartmental finding that the aircraft is not sophisticated.

No major missile system or associated support equipment has ever been approved for sale if Latin America, although the Sidewinder air-to-air missile has been sold




Trile Project	(#S19990	0006)	á
U.S. Departm	ent of Sta	ıte ,	_
Release	_Excise _	Deny_ <u>/</u> _	Declass
Exemption(s))		



TAB C LIZI

ITEMS RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL

- 1. Medium Tanks The Chileans have under consideration both the M-48 and M-60 medium tanks. The main difference between the two tanks is that the M-60 has a 105mm gun as against the M-48's 90mm gun. Both tanks have the same weight, same engine, and many common parts. The Department has approved the sale of both the M-48 and M-60 medium tanks under FMS to interested Latin American countries.
- 2. F-5E A supersonic fighter aircraft that was specifically designed for lesser developed countries. The F-5E is capable of performing both air defense and ground support roles. Presidential Determination No. 73-14 found that the use of FMS credit to support the sale of the F-5E to Chile as well as to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela was important to the national security of the United States.
- 3. Air Traffic Control Radar The Chileans plan to use this type equipment for civilian application in air traffic control. The same system provides a limited air defense capability. The specific radars and related equipments will be identified by a site survey team.
- 4. Non-lethal Equipment (Vehicles, clothing, engineer, and communication). Military vehicles include such items as ambulances, jeeps, trucks, and small trailers. Clothing items are primarily cold weather gear. Engineer items under consideration include compasses, binoculars, and direction finders while the communications equipment includes the standard AN/PRC-74 Field Radio and receivers.
- 5. Vehicle-mounted Recoilless Rifles, Armored Personnel Carriers, and Mortar Carriers
- a. Recoilless Rifles The 106mm recoilless rifle is a portable weapon which can be fired from a ground or vehicle mount. It is utilized as light artillery against field fortifications, armored vehicles, personnel, and automatic weapons by direct or indirect fire. Spain sold Chile a number of 106mm recoilless rifles following the September coup.



b. Armored Personnel Carriers - Chile has requested the M-113Al Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) which is a lightweight, full-tracked vehicle which transports 12 troops plus driver. It is capable of amphibious operation across lakes and streams, of extended cross-country travel over rough terrain, and of high speed operation on improved roads and highways. The M-113Al APC has been sold to several Latin American countries.

c. Armored Mortar Carriers - The Chileans have requested to purchase ten armored self-propelled, mortar carriers. This is a lightweight, full-tracked, amphibious vehicle which carries an 81mm mortar. This weapon is used as a mobile close support weapon for infantry.

URCLASSIFIED



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants:

Alejandro Gonzalez, Vicariate of Solidarity

Lawyer

Daniel H. Clare, American Embassy

Date & Place:

March 3, 1977, Vicariate

Distribution: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/R, CONS, USIS, DAO, ECON

ARA/AND/CH, INR/OIL/B, INR/RRA

Subject:

Human Rights Scene: Discontent within the

Military

Disappearances: Gonzalez said that the Vicariate's processing one disappearance which has come to its attention since the beginning of the year-- a 35-year-old male with no known political affiliation. Meanwhile, it plans to send next week to the UNHRC and IAHRC a new compilation of previous disappearances -- a total of 800 plus persons (415 of whom are already named in the five-volume study). Not. included are those missing in the aftermath of the coup and other cases of, from the Vicariate's standpoint, dubious reliability. We are promised a copy.

Gonzalez showed me photostats on the Carlos Contreras case, in which a Carabinero Captain testified that he was at the scene awaiting an ambulance for Contreras when three men drove up, identified themselves as DINA agents and took Contreras away screaming. Another sworn statement from a municipal judge asserts that the license plate on the car, as reported by the Carabinero, was picked up as assigned to FACH intelligence. The Vicariate thinks that the FACH people were assigned to DINA -- not freelancing for . FACH intelligence.

Regarding the four persons who allegedly travelled to Argentina January 6, Gonzalez noted that they left Chile in a car with Argentine tags and appeared on the other side of the pass in a car with Santiago tags. The municipality of Santiago swears that the plate was never issued and should have been destroyed.

		ASSI	FIED
--	--	------	------

Chile Project U.S. Departm	ent of Sta	ite	
Release _	_Excise _	_Deny_	✓ Declass
Exemption(s)			



-2- .

Some Still Alive: Gonzalez reviewed the case of Victor Diaz Lopez. The press and Radio Moscow have recently been mentioning Mrs. Diaz' habeas corpus petition filed in October 1976, which refers to a letter she received from her husband. According to Gonzalez, in late July or early August DINA agents called on Mrs. Diaz and told her not to press for his release, since he was still alive and well. She demanded to see him in person. The agents said that was impossible but said she would receive a call from him. Sure enough, a few days later she did. But she insisted on seeing him and a few days after the conversation the men appeared again with a letter written by Diaz asking his wife not to push the case. She went to the Vicariate and they decided to lay off. (Recently the case leaked out and is now getting publicity. a PCCh leader, had been detained in May and was among those the GOC told the UNHRC went to Argentina the same month.) Gonzalez said the Vicariate believes that some of those disappeared may still be alive -- although not They have received enough indications necessarily Diaz. from next of kin and from military officers to persuade them that the chance still exists. The Vicariate is holding its hopes closely so as not to raise false expectations. It realizes the GOC's dilemma in releasing such persons. Gonzalez recalled a case six months ago when Argentine authorities "discovered" a group of Uruguayan labor leaders meeting in Buenos Aires. generally believed that they had been held by Uruguayan authorities for some time previously. The Argentines expelled the group to Uruguay, which in turn expelled them to Europe. COMMENT: Interesting that the Vicariate appears to be getting some information from military men. Interesting also that it would lend credence to such stories, since one well known tactic has been to intimate (per the Diaz case) that persons will stay alive as long as the family or interested groups do not push too hard. I had the feeling that Gonzalez was floating the alleged Uruguayan example as the kind of facesaving device the GOC could use if it chose to surface some of those long disappeared.

Harassment: Gonzalez said security forces are harassing and intimidating people rather than holding them in detention. At least 50 cases have come to the attention of the Vicariate in which people were picked up and held for a few hours, interrogated, threatened and then released.

-3-

Security Laws: Gonzalez said the Vicariate had no information on what the GOC planned to do about the state of emergency/security laws, etc., decisions coming up in the next two weeks. He thought that it might go to latent subversion on the basis of a new anti-terrorist law which would make political crimes illegal -- so no preventive detention. Such cases would be heard before military courts. COMMENT: Sounded as if he were guessing.

Political Climate: Gonzalez said that there were many rumors about friction within the military. The Air Force was supposedly meeting during the last few days -- among themselves and with some civilians -- in sessions authorized by General Leigh to discuss replacement of all Junta members and promulgation of a new policy of national reconciliation. Admiral Castro was being mentioned as the new Navy participant. Gonzalez said that the military was enraged at an ultimatum passed out by President Pinochet which would concentrate all powers in him. COMMENT: The story of Pinochet's ultimatum and friction within the Services is certainly getting around. It's hard to keep that kind of secret even in today's Chile.

POL:DHOTare:jka March 4, 1977 Approved: DCM: TDBoyatt

POL: CRStout

AMB: DHPopper

Donnaly HIR hog





PAGE 01 SANTIA 01885 101825Z

UNCLASSIFIED



62 ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 AID-20 OMB-01 DRC-01 /156 W

R 101745Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8142
INFO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

Chile Project (#S199900006)
U.S. Department of State

Variety Declass

Leave Deny Declass

Leave Deny Declass

SANTIAGO 1885

E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: CI, FI, PFOR

SUBJ: CHILE PROTESTS FINNISH INTERVENTION

REF: HELSINKI 0613

- 1. GOC ANNOUNCED APRIL 9 THAT "ENERGETIC" PROTEST WAS HANDED TO FINNISH CHARGE IN SANTIAGO APRIL 3. ATTENDANCE BY PRIME MINISTER AT OPENING SESSION IN HELSINKI MARCH 21 OF "INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON CRIMES OF CHILEAN JUNTA" AND SUBSEQUENT ATTENDANCE BY FINNISH MINISTER OF EDUCATION CONSTITUTED FINNISH INTERVENTION IN CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, ACCORDING TO ANNOUNCEMENT.
- 2. PRESS REPORTS THAT FINNISH CHARGE BROTHERUS WAS SUMMONED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY APRIL 8 AND ASKED FOR REPLY TO GOC'S APRIL 3 NOTE BEFORE DEPARTURE OF FONMIN HUERTA FOR WASHINGTON MFM MEETING APRIL 14.
- 3. COMMENT: PROTEST RECALLS SIMILAR GOC REPRESENTATIONS TO SWEDEN OVER PRESENCE OF PRIME MINISTER PALME AT "PRIVATE"

PAGE 02 SANTIA 01885 101825Z

CEREMONY IN WHICH FUNDS DESTINED FOR "CHILEAN RESISTANCE" WERE PRESENTED TO A DAUGHTER OF LATE PRES ALLENDE. SIGNIFICANCE OF SETTING TERMINAL DATE FOR FINNISH REPLY UNCLEAR.

DOC_NUMBER: 1974SANTIA01885

CHANNEL: D/a

13



UNULASSITIEU

PAGE 01 SANTIA 01902 1023122

13

ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

IR-16/16/SE

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-2

USIA-15 AID-20 DRC-01 /130 W

036546

R 102220Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8150
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
USUN NEW YORK 751
USMISSION GENEVA

SANTIAGO 1902

Chile Project (#\$199900006)
U.S. Department of State
__Release : Excise ___Deny _

Release Excise Deny Decias
Exemption(s) 61 33

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, PDEV, CI

SUBJECT: GEN. PINOCHET-CARDINAL SILVA MEETING

- 1. SUMMARY: SOURCE CLOSE TO CARDINAL SILVA REPORTS JUNTA PRESIDENT PINOCHET SYMPATHETIC TO FORMER'S PROTESTATIONS OF CONCERN AT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. CARDINAL REPORTEDLY FEELS PINOCHET MOVING TOWARD BECOMING SINGLE RULER OF CHILE. END SUMMARY.
- 2. REV. RENATO POBLETE, S.J., TOLD PRESS ATTACHE THAT CARDINAL SILVA HAD LENGHTY THREE HOUR DINNER WITH JUNTA PRESIDENT GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET ON MAR. 28. DINNER WAS AT PINOCHET'S INVITATION AFTER PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED DINNER INCLUDING POBLETE, MINECON FERNANDO LENIZ AND ECONADVISOR CARLOS MASSAD, WAS CANCELLED AT LAST MINUTE POBLETE HAD ARRANGED DINNER THROUGH CIVILIAN ECONOMISTS TO TREAT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AND RELATED SUBJECTS.

MORNING OF 28TH GROUP DINNER CALLED OFF DUE "ILLNESS" MRS. PINOCHET BUT LATER IN DAY PINOCHET'S AIDE-DE-CAMP CALLED CARDINAL EXTENDING INVITATION IN GENERAL'S NAME FOR CARDINAL ALONE.

3. ACCORDING POBLETE, DINNER WAS HIGHLY POSITIVE AND PROVIDED CARDINAL WITH OPPORTUNITY TO COVER WIDE RANGE OF PROBLEMS INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. CARDINAL TOLD PINOCHET THAT ARRESTS AND TORTURE



PAGE 02 SANTIA 01902 1023122

CONTINUING ALTHOUGH PINOCHET HAD STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT HE HAD GIVEN ORDERS TO CEASE TORTURES. ALSO SAID PINOCHET WAS BEING MISINFORMED AS TO WHAT ACTUALLY TAKING PLACE. CARDINAL FURNICIZE

DOC_NUMBER: 1974SAN


ing state of the n/s

Date Printed: 01/17/1999

Page - 1

THAT CATHOLIC CHURCH COULD NOT REMAIN SILENT MUCH LONGER IF SUCH SITUATION CONTINUED. PINOCHET REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDINAND FIRM INTENTION LOOK INTO MATTER IN ORDER TO CLEAR UP SITUATION.

- 4. CARDINAL ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR FORMER FONMIN AND UP LEADER CLODOMIRO ALMEYDA, MAINTAINING ALMEYDA SUBJECT OF MISTREATMENT. FE: DAYS LATER ALMEYDA REMOVED FROM AIR FORCE ACADEMY AND RETURNED TO ARMY TACNA REGIMENT. POBLETE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ALMEYDA WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RELEASED WITH NO CHARGES BEING PRESSED. (LATTER ONLY POBLETE'S SPECULATION.)
- 5. OTHER SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION RELATED TO CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY TV CHANNLE 13 DIRECTOR RAUL HASBUN (SEE SANTIAGO 1543). PINOCHET REPORTEDLY UPSET WAY MATTER WAS HANDLED AND EXPRESSED REGRETS. (VICENTE PEREZ, FORMER CHANNEL 13 NEWS DIRECTOR AND CLOSE TO HASBUN TOLD IO THAT CARDINAL HAD POINTED OUT TO INOCHET THAT CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES IN BRAZIL NOT AFFECTED BY BRAZILIAN MILITARY, TO WHICH PINOCHET ALLEGEDLY REPLIED THAT WITHIN 90 DAYS BOTH CHIEEAN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES WOULD BE RETUNED TO CHURCH CONTROL. HE SPECULATED THAT HUSBUN MIGHT THEN BE NAMED VICE-RECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS AT CATHOLIC UNIV. AND THEREBY MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER CHANNEL 13. ACCORDING POBLETE, HASBUN HAD BEEN OFFERED POSITION AS DIRECTOR OF GOC NATIONAL TV CHANNEL 7 WHICH HE REJECTED.)
- 6. DAY AFTER DINNER, PINOCHET CALLED LENIZ TO THANK HIM FOR HELPING SET UP MEETING WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "VERY USEFUL" AND PRAISED CARDINAL AS "TRUE PATRIOT". LENIZ RELAYED COMPLIMENTS TO POBLETE WHO IS HIS CLOSE FRIEND. POBLETE ADDED THAT LENIZ NOW REPORTING MORE AND MORE DIRECTLY TO PINOCHET RATHER THAN JUNTA MEMBER ADMIRAL MERINO WHO HAS ECONOMIC AREA UNDER HIS PURVIEW.
- 7. CARDINAL'S IMPRESSIONS AS RELAYED THROUGH POBLETE ARE THAT PINOCHET MOST RELAIBLE MEMBER OF JUNTA, THAT HE TAKING FIRMER HAND IN RUNNING THINGS AND WITHIN SIX MONTHS WILL EMERGE AS SINGLE RULER OF CHILE AND NOT SIMPLY FIRST AMONG EQUALS IN JUNTA.
- 8. CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY RECTOR-DELEGATE SWETT OFFICIALLY INAUGURATED ACADEMIC YEAR YESTERDAY, APRIL 9. CARDINAL DID NOT ATTEND CEREMONY



Date Printed: 01/17/1999

PAGE 03 SANTIA 01902 1023122

AND, AS CHANCELLOR OF UNIVERSITY, WAS CONSPICUOUS BY HIS ABSENCE IN PRESS AND T.V. COVERAGE. POBLETE CONFIRMED OUR SUSPICION THAT CARDINAL'S ABSENCE WAS INTENTIONAL.

- 9. OTHER SOURCE TOLD EMBOFF THAT QUESTION OFHOLY CROSS SCHOOL RAISED BY CARDINAL IN DISCUSSION WITH PINOCHET WHO EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS TO RESOLVE ISSUE ALONG LINES SATISFACTORY TO CARDINAL AND PERMIT SCHOOL RETURN TO CHURCH CONTROL.
- 10. COMMENT: THIS REPORT TENDS TO CONFIRM SIMILA



DOC_NUMBER: 1974SANTIAJ1

ACCOUNT OF HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSION THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT CARDINAL IS DOING EVERYTHING HE CAN, WITHOUT UNDUE PUBLICITY, TO PRESS THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, AND WE KNOW FROM OUR CLOSE CONTACT WITH LENIZ THAT HE TOO WOULD BE IMPELLED TO URGE PINOCHET TO MOVE IN THE SAME DIRECTION. AT SAME TIME, FATHER POBLETE SO COMMITTED EMOTIONALLY THAT WE CANNOT RELY FUL ON ACCURACY OF HIS DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS. ACCORDINGLY, WHILE WE HOPE PINOCHET WILL BE IMPRESSED BY REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND WILL SEEK TO MOVE JUNTA IN MORE LIBERAL DIRECTION, IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO CONCLUDE FORM FOREGOING ALONE THAT THIS WILLBE THE CASE. POPPER

NNN

Current Handling Restrictions n/a

Current Classification ***

Page - 3

Date Printed: 01/17/1999

DOC_NUMBER: 1974SANTIA01902

CHANNEL: n/a

-cc: funt

MEMORANDUM

TO:

ARA/LA - Mr. Shlaudeman

Date:

April 12, 1974

FROM:

ARA - George Lister

SUBJECT:

Film by Charles Horman

A one hour film made in Chile by Charles Horman, "Chile: With Poems and Guns", is now being shown around the U.S. One of Horman's collaborators in making the film was Don Bray, of California State University. I debated Bray publicly in California several years ago, and have seen him on various occasions since. I would describe his political views as being on the far left.

The film begins with something to the effect that Horman did not have the support of his Embassy, and was killed. It then reviews Chilean history, exploitation by the Spaniards, Americans, etc., and the achievements of the Allende regime. Some still shots of the coup are included. One live interview takes place at the Stadium, apparently after the prisoners had been removed. Alleged atrocities are described. There is considerable criticism of the USG's alleged role.

Perhaps Horman's film making led to his death.

cc: ARA/BC - Mr. Karkashian 🗸 Santiago Embassy

Chile Project (#S199900006)
U.S. Department of State
_____ Release ____ Excise ___ Deny ___ Declas
Exemption(s) _____







MEMORANDUM TO FILES

April 26, 1974

FROM:

POL: RSSteven

SUBJ:

FACh Trials -- Miscellaneous Observations


- l. I attended the April 25 session of the Chilean Air Force trials, during which the cases of three enlisted men were heard -- Corporals (ex) Rodriguez, Benavides, and Maldonado. Each was accused of violations of Article 299 of the Code of Military Justice, which covers infractions of military discipline such as that charged, participation in politics.
- 2. Among those present of interest to us were Covey Oliver and the Cerman, Professor Kurt Madlener, of the ICJ. Monseñor (and Secretary) Piero Biggio, an Italian in the Nunciatura, an officer of the Rumanian Embassy, Jaime Castillo V. of the PDC and Fabiola Letelier, sister of Orlando. Fabiola Letelier is an attorney herself, and thus permitted to attend the trial.
 - 3. Security measures appear capricious: most of the visitors were carefully checked, including "frisking," but I was waved on untouched on the basis of my diplomatic ID, in contrast to my colleagues Tipton and Davidow who were searched previously.
 - 4. Those who have attended since the opening of the trials told me that attendance by observers and press has fallen off markedly. The courtroom was less than one-third filled.
 - 5. Several of the defense lawyers are attending regularly, although their own clients are not scheduled to appear for some time. One defense attorney, Miguel Switzer, who I gathered is well known as a criminal lawyer, told me that he needs to observe the process and hear the testimony so as to be best prepared to defend his client, a "conscript" for whom the death penalty has been asked.
 - 6. I was struck by how little the trial resembles the type of process we are used to under the Anglo-Saxon tradition. We have not understood fully, and certainly have not conveyed to the Department, the effect the Chilean system of law based on Hispanic and Roman traditions has on the process and our perception of it. This "trial"

Chile Project (#\$199900006)	
U.S.Department of State	
ReleaseExciseDenyDec	- 225
Exemption(s)	
	•



consists of a ten to fifteen minute (I timed three cases) presentation by the Fiscal, who reads excerpts from the testimony/confessions of the defendant and others charged in the trials. In all three cases I heard, the entire case rested upon assertions by three or four others that the defendant attended meetings with them or participated in political discussions. The defense attorney then read for some forty-five minutes a prepared statement -- in all three cases admitting that the defendant did indeed discuss politics, but denying any act which would constitute a violation of the Code. In each case the youth and inexperience of the defendant was emphasized, and his belief that, if anything, he was defending the legally elected Government of his Commander in Chief. In all three cases, it was held that "on the day, " September II. the defendants served valightly and loyally in their units. The attorneys asked for, first, absolution, or second, judicial dismissal from the FACh, or third, reduction of sentences to the minimum sixty-one days. Only one of the defendants presented any witnesses -- a landlady and her daughter who asserted he was a good boy while he lived with them.

- 7. There is no cross-examination, nor are the persons who accuse the defendants of being fellow cell-members brought to testify. Mr. Madlener, the German expert of the ICJ, told me that what we are seeing is typical of the Spanish legal tradition. According to him, the part of the process which we are used to seeing in our courts, the building of proof, has already been accomplished in the investigations of the Fiscal. The Court in effect will accept the documentation submitted by the Fiscal as the evidence in the case, and the defense will not go "behind" that. The "trial" we are seeing is a discussion of the Fiscal's findings, presentation of mitigating circumstances, and arguments concerning interpretation and applicability of the law itself, not the evidence. When I suggested that the defense was handicapped in not being able to examine the persons whose testimony was used by the Fiscal, one of the Chilean lawyers pointed out that this can be an advantage, too, as the Court and Fiscal also cannot question the witnesses and "Improve" the prosecution case.
- 8. The defense lawyers are not hacks. I gather that most if not all are privately engaged rather than appointed by the Court, and several are prominent and respected. All three today emphasized that their clients saw the Allende regime as the constitutional government, observed their military superiors ostensibly supporting it by serving in the Cabinet, putting down the "tancazo," etc. "They could not know the minds of their superiors." When they knew what their superiors wanted (on Sept 11) they promptly obeyed orders and supported the coup.



- 9. Lawyer Nurieldin Hermosilla, Bandera 162, phone 60171, was observing the trial in preparation for the defense of his clients, three officers who will appear later. He told me that the Letelier family has engaged him to represent Orlando if any charges are actually brought against him. Hermosilla sent a letter to Letelier on Dawson Island to tell him of the fact, but he has never received reply. He assumes that no repeat no charges have been formally brought against Letelier yet. If the GOC proceeds as expected, he feels the defense will be given about forty-five days to prepare, which means no trial for Letelier before June at the earliest. He knows of no charges yet filed against any of the other Dawson Islanders. Hermosilla read to me briefly from his draft notes on the defense of his FACh clients, in which he asserts he will say that it is extraordinary that the military authorities are trying enlisted men for "deliberating on politics" when the generals and colonels themselves are the prime example of those in the military under the past regime who "deliberated on politics."
- 10. Fabiola Letelier, an attorney and sister of Orlando, attended as an observer. She told me that to the best of her knowledge and that of her sister-in-law, Isabella Letelier, Orlando is still on Dawson and that no charges have been filed. No one in the family has seen him since Isabella was allowed a short time with him in Punta Arenas last fall. She was wearing a black stone carved by Orlando on Dawson--which he gave to Isabella when they met--with his prison ID number S-26 and his sister's name. She said that the family's economic circumstances are only fair. Mrs. Letelier has had to sell many things, and is now doing translations for pay. She applied for a job teaching at the Nido de Aguilas, but was rejected by the Board--she understood over concern for the political aspects of the matter. (I do not know what the facts in this are.) If Orlando is released, they hope to leave Chile and settle in the US. Orlando has an offer to teach at "Buffalo." Fabiola said that Mrs. Letelier would like very much to call on Amb. Popper but is hesitant to ask.

POL:RSSteven:gkl

cc: BIO--Orlando Leteller
Deputy Asst. Secretary Shlaudeman
ARA/BC
POL/R



3

PAGE 01 SANTIA 02282 2716442

71 ACTION ARA-20

UNCLASSIFIED

E509)

R

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AID-20 PC-04 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 /134 W ------- 089321

R 271603Z APR 74 FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8376

SANTIAGO 2282

Chile Project (#S199900006)
U.S. Department of State

__Release __Excise __Deny __
Exemption(s)

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: CI, PINS, PGOV

SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF MILITARY TRIALS

REF: SANTIAGO 1508

- 1. JAIME GUZMAN, CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL AND PRIME MOVER OF THE GREMIO MOVEMENT, MEMBER OF THE JUNTA'S CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING COMMISSION, AND INTIMATE OF JUNTA MEMBER GENERAL LEIGH, TOLD EMBOFFS AT AMBASSADOR'S LUNCHEON APRIL 26 THAT HE HAS BEEN DISCUSSING SERIOUSLY WITH LEIGH IDEA OF ISSUANCE OF DECREE LAW PERMITTING APPEAL FROM VERDICTS OF MILITARY COURTS TO SUPREME COURT DURING "STATE OF WAR" AS WELL AS "STATE OF PEACE." THIS WOULD HAVE FAVORABLE IMPACT ON BOTH CHILEAN AND FOREIGN OPINION, GUZMAN SAID, BUT PRIME RATIONALE WOULD BE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF ADDED PROTECTION FOR ACCUSED.
- 2. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, IN GUZMAN'S OPINION, CERTAIN DISADVANTAGES IN TAMPERING WITH EXISTING LEGAL ORDER. JUNTA IS
 RELUCTANT GOVT, AND PREFERS TO SEE ITSELF AND BE SEEN BY
 WORLD OPINION AS FREE TO ACT ONLY WITHIN RESTRAINTS OF
 INHERITED LEGAL ORDER. ALTHOUGH PARTICULAR MOVE PROPOSED
 WOULD BE GENERALLY APPLAUDED, IT SETS PRECEDENT OF JUNTAIMPOSED CHANGE IN LEGAL ORDER AND WOULD RAISE CONCERN THAT
 JUNTA CAN AS EASILY CHANGE OTHER ASPECTS OF RELATION WITH
 JUDICIARY WHICH IT BEING CAREFUL TO PRESERVE.

PAGE 02 SANTIA 02282 271644Z

3. NOT CLEAR FROM CONVERSATION WHETHER PROPOSAL HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH REST OF JUNTA OR ONLY WITH LEIGH.



- COMMENT. GUZMAN DID NOT RAISE ANOTHER ASPECT OF THIS INTERESTING IDEA, WHICH IS REACTION OF SUPREME COURT IF ASKED OR REQUIRED TO TAKE AN APPEAL FUNCTION. COURT HAS BEEN QUITE CONTENT TO KEEP CLEAR OF WHOLE BUSINESS OF INVOLVEMENT WITH MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM "IN TIME OF WAR" (SEE REFTEL).
- WERE IT NOW TO BECOME INVOLVED, COURT WOULD NOT IN OUR OPINION BE RUBBER STAMP. IT MIGHT IN SPECIFIC CASES BE FORCED INTO LEGAL POSITIONS AT ODDS WITH THOSE OF GOC. FACT THAT SO PROMINENT A RIGHT-WING SUPPORTER OF GOVERNMENT IS ADVOCATING A MOVE WHICH WOULD MAKE THIS SITUATION POSSIBLE IS AN INTERESTING INDICATION THAT PRESSURE OF OUTSIDE OPINION (AND CONCEALED CHILEAN OPINION) MAY BE HAVING AN EFFECT ON GOVERNMENT. WE WOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE REGARD PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF GUZMAN IDEA AS VERY HIGH, BUT WE THINK THE DISCUSSION ITSELF IS SIGNIFICANT. POPPER

NNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

Current Classification ***

Page - 2

91

PAGE 01 SANTIA 02373

43 ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 AID-20 PC-10 SR-02 ORM-03 DRC-01 (ISO) W 026965

R 031328Z MAY 74 FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8427

ANTIAGO 2373

Chile Project (#\$199900006) U.S/Department of State \/Release __Excise __Deny _ Exemption(s)_

EO 11652: N/A TAGS: CI, PINT

SUBJ: GEN LEIGH TALKS OF LEGITIMACY, MILITARY JUSTICE AND

PRESENT TASKS

- SUMMARY. AIR FORCE CINC GEN GUSTAVO LEIGH, WIDELY REGARDED AS MOST OUTSPOKEN AND ARTICULATE MEMBER OF JUNTA, GAVE MAJOR SPEECH AT OPENING OF CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOI ACADEMIC YEAR APRIL 29. LEIGH DEFENDED LEGITIMACY OF JUNTA AND FAIRNESS OF MILITARY TRIALS NOW IN PROCESS, ADMITTED SOME ABUSES OF PRISONERS HAD OCCURRED BUT SAID THEY HAVE BEEN CORRECTED, AND TOOK SEVERAL CLEAR SLAPS AT CHURCH AND AT CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICIANS WHO HE CLAIMED ARE PARTIALLY TO BLAME FOR SITUATION IN WHICH ARMED FORCES HAD TO ACT. END SUMMARY.
- LEGITIMACY OF JUNTA LEIGH ARGUED THAT PRESENT GOVT *WAS BORN WITH FULL LEGITIMACY OF ORIGIN SINCE WHAT HAPPENED SEPT 11 CONSTITUTED THE LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF REBELLION AGAINST AN ILLEGITIMATE, IMMORAL, AND UNSUCCESSFUL GOVT WHICH HAD GRAVELY AND DELIBERATELY STRAYED FROM THE COMMON WELFARE AND WAS SUBJUGATING THE COUNTRY TO HUNGER AND FRATRICIDAL CONFRONTATION. " OVERTHROW OF SUCH A GOVT IS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED AS LEGITIMATE, LEIGH CLAIMED. "OUR (ARMED FORCES) INTERVENTION WAS A SACRED AND UNAVOIDABLE DUTY. MOREOVER,

PAGE 02 SANTIA 02373

*OUR LEGITIMACY STEMS NOT ONLY FROM OUR ORIGIN BUT ALSO FROM THE WAY IN WHICH WE HAVE EXERCISED POWER....WE HAVE MAINTAINED WITHOUT ALTERATION OUR STATE OF LAW IN ALL BASIC ASPECTS,

WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE EMERGENCY (SECURITY) MEASURES WHICH THIS STATE OF LAW CONTAINS."

- 3. MILITARY JUSTICE AND TRIALS. STRESSING THAT A STATE OF INTERNAL WAR WAS "NO JURIDICAL FICTION BUT A TRAGIC REALITY." LEIGH TOOK NOTE OF CRITICISM OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS OPERATING UNDER WAR-TIME RULES. HE SHARPLY DENIED THAT WAR-TIME RULES MEAN THAT "ACTS COMMITTED PRIOR TO SEPT 11 WOULD BE PUNISHED MORE SEVERELY" THAN UNDER PEACE-TIME RULES SINCE "THE PENALTIES PROVIDED IN THE CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE FOR A SPECIFIED CRIME GENERALLY DO NOT VARY IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN TIME OF PEACE OR IN TIME OF WAR. " CONSEQUENTLY, HE CONTINUED, PRESENT TRIALS BEFORE MILITARY TRIBUNALS ARE WITHIN CHILEAN LEGAL TRADITION THAT A PERSON MAY BE PUNISHED ONLY FOR AN ACT WHICH WAS PUNISHABLE BY LAW PRIOR TO ITS COMMISSION, AND BY THE PENALTY APPLICABLE AT THE TIME ACT WAS COMMITTED. LEIGH STATED THAT THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY WITH ABOVE IN APPLYING CONCEPT OF "THE ENEMY" TO "THOSE SUBVERSIVE GROUPS ORGANIZED BY MARXISM, (STARTING) FROM THE VERY INSTANT IN WHICH THEY BECAME MILITARILY ORGANIZED TO SPREAD VIOLENCE, CORRUPTION, AND GENOCIDE AND TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE TOTAL POWER INCLUDING THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR MILITARY INSTITUTIONS."
- 4. COMMENT LEIGH IS BASICALLY CORRECT REGARDING SIMILARITY OF PENALTIES IN CHILEAN MILITARY CODE OF JUSTICE, BUT THIS BEGS SEVERAL BASIC ISSUES. FOR EXAMPLE, CIVIL APPEAL CAN BE TAKEN FROM MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN TIME OF PEACE WHEREAS IT CANNOT (AT PRESENT) IN TIME OF WAR. ALSO, MANY DEFENDANTS ARE BEING PROSECUTED UNDER PROVISIONS OF CODE WHICH PRESUME A WARTIME SETTING (E.G. PASSING MILITARY SECRETS TO "THE ENEMY"), WHEREAS SAME ACT COMMITTED IN PEACETIME WOULD BE PUNISHABLE UNDER DIFFERENT PROVISIONS OF CODE (E.G. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS). END COMMENT
- 5. ABUSE OF PRISONERS LEIGH ADMITTED THAT "UNFORTUNATELY, AND AGAINST OUR WISHES, THE POWERS INHERENT IN THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IN WHICH WE ARE LIVING HAVE GIVEN RISE TO THE COM-

PAGE 03 SANTIA 02373 031449Z


MISSION OF SOME ABUSES." THESE ARE "ISOLATED CASES" AND HAVE BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED, HE SAID; "WHEN SUCH EXCEPTIONAL ABUSES HAVE COME TO OUR ATTENTION --- WE HAVE BEGUN THE APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND THERE ARE MEMBERS OF OUR OWN ARMED SERVICES WHO HAVE BEEN PENALIZED BY MILITARY TRIBUNALS." COMMENT: THIS IS FIRST EMBASSY HAS HEARD OF SUCH CASES. END COMMENT.

6. ROOT CAUSES OF PRESENT SITUATION - "THERE ARE THOSE," SAID LEIGH, "WHO FROM THEIR LOFTY PERCHES, MAINLY OVERSEAS BUT

DOC_NUMBER: 1974SANTIA02373
Page - 2

24


ALSO IN CHILE, EXPRESS THEIR ANGUISH AND THEIR PREOCCUPATION ABOUT THE RIGORS OF THE SITUATION IN WHICH WE LIVE. " (COMMENT: LEIGH FROBABLY HAD RECENT BISHOPS STATEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN MIND.) FOR SUCH PERSONS, LEIGH TRACED THREE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF SITUATION: (1) THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CHILEAN INTELLECTUALS FOR PROPAGATING THE "FOREIGN DOCTRINE OF MARXISM-LENINISM." (2) THE ROLE OF "GROUPS OF CHRISTIAN INSPIRATION (COMMENT: I.E. THE PDC) AND EVEN ECCLESIASTICAL GROUPS -- IN SEEKING DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS WITH MARXISM, IN FOMENTING A STERILE CLASS STRUGGLE, AND IN SEEKING THE DESTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY AND DISCIPLINE OF ALL KINDS. " "GENERALLY ALL THIS HAPPENED WITH THE TOLERANCE, OR WITH THE WEAK AND MUTED OBJECTIONS, OF THOSE WHOSE MISSION IT WAS PROMPTLY TO STOP SUCH CONFUSION. " (3) "THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THOSE POLITICIANS WHO, THROUGH THEIR DEMAGOGURERY, THEIR PARTISAN POLITICAL SPIRIT, OR THEIR LACK OF VISION, PREFERRED THE EASY ROAD OF CAJOLERY WHICH PRODUCED VOTES TO TAKING THE MEASURES WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED CHILE TO ACHIEVE AN ACCELERATED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVE SOCIAL JUSTICE. " WHILE THIS TREND BECAME ACCENTUATED UNDER THE UP, "THE LIBERTINISM HAD ALREADY BEGUN EARLIER; OTHERWISE, PERHAPS MARXISM WOULD NEVER HAVE COME TO POWER IN OUR COUNTRY." (COMMENT: THIS IS A DIRECT ALLUSION TO THE FREI ADMINISTRATION AND THE PDC.) FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS, LEIGH CONCLUDED, "WE ARE ABSOLUTELY DETERMINED TO RIP OUT THIS (MALIGNANT TUMOR) BY THE ROOTS." FOR THOSE WHO ASK A QUICK RETURN TO AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, "WE WILL NOT TURN OVER COMMAND UNTIL OUR PROFOUND CREATIVE AND RECTIFYING TASK IS CONCLUDED. " THE PARTY SYSTEM IN EFFECT BEFORE SEPT 11 IS "AN OUTMODED SYSTEM," AND THE TASK OF THE JUNTA IS TO DESIGN NEW AND MODERN MECHANISMS OF GOVERNMENT IN ACCORD WITH THE TIMES



PAGE 04 SANTIA 02373 031449Z

7. COMMENT. INTENSE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO LEIGH SPEECH INDICATIVE OF IMPORTANCE GOC ATTRIBUTES TO IT AS A STATEMENT OF POLICY. LEIGH'S TONE THROUGHOUT WAS UNAPOLOGETIC DEFENSE OF JUNTA ACTIONS AND POLICIES; EVEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT SOME ABUSE OF PRISONERS HAD OCCURRED WAS PHRASED IN PAST TENSE. PICTURE WHICH EMERGES IS THAT OF A GOVT LEADER WHO IS PASSIONATELY CONVINCED GOC ACTIONS ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND MORALLY CORRECT, WHO IS OPPOSED TO POLITICKING OF KIND WHICH PREVAILED BEFORE SEPT 11, AND WHO BELIEVES CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS -- AND CHURCH -- SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVENTS WHICH LED TO COUP.

DECONTROLLED ONE YEAR.
POPPER



PAGE 01 STATE 237348

16

ORIGIN ARA-20

£255)

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SCI-06 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 USIA-15 PRS-01

HEW-08 /106 R

DRAFTED BY ARA/BC/C:AISAACS:MBB APPROVED BY ARA/BC:JEKARKASHIAN

SCI:MBEAUBIEN(SUBS) ARA:HSHLAUDEMAN(INFO)

030871

R 042203Z DEC 73 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

UNCLAS STATE 237348

Chile Project (#\$199900006)
U.S/ Department of State
_____Release ____Excise ____Deny ____Declase
Exemption(s) _______

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS; CI

SUBJECT: SITUATION OF DR. HERNAN HENRIQUEZ

1. NIH HAS REPORT THAT DR. HERNAN HENRIQUEZ, IDENTIFIED AS DIRECTOR OF SNS' FIFTH (OR TENTH) HEALTH ZONE DURING ALLENDE PERIOD, MAY HAVE BEEN EXECUTED IN SEPT 11 AFTERMATH, AND WOULD APPRECIATE VERIFICATION OF HIS STATUS IF POSSIBLE. HENRIQUEZ PARTICIPATED IN JUNE 1973 NIH SYMPOSIUM AT BETHESDA. KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Demócrata Cristiano Aylwin escapa estrechamente de ser arrestado De acuerdo (con lo informado) por el ex-Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados Luis Pareto (protegido; pudiera significar "bajo protección de esta embajada), el Presidente del PDC y ex-Senador P. Aylwin frustró su arresto por parte de una patrulla militar en Talca, que incursionó (ingresó) a una reunión de discusión política diez o quince minutos más tarde (de su salida). La ocasión era una reunión social de unos veinte miembros destacados del P.D.C. ofrecida en el hogar - la tarde del 4 de mayo - por el ex-Diputado Gustavo Ramírez. La Patrulla Militar, con personal bajo el mando del Comandante de la Zona, apareció alrededor de las 11.30 hras (P.M.) para investigar (sobre) una reunión política que se efectuaba en ese momento. Junto a (Gustavo) Ramírez había otros prominentes líderes del P.D.C. como el ex-Senador Foncea, pero Aylwin afortunadamente había partido recién (instantes antes) todos fueron llevados al Cuartel, donde se les interrogó durante la noche y fueron liberades al día siguiente, sin cargos.

A continuación sigue algunas declaraciones de Pareto sobre las actividades políticas en Chile y lo difícil que él ve el devenir de los acontecimientos.

PAGE 01 SANTIA 02524 091622Z

(E524)

62 ACTION ARA-20

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 AID-20 DRC-01 /116 W

092655

R 091545Z MAY 74 FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8515

SANTIAGO 2524

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: CI, PINT, PINS, MILI

SUBJECT: PDC'S AYLWIN NARROWLY ESCAPES ARREST

- 1. ACCORDING TO FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES LUIS PARETO (PROTECT), CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) PRESIDENT AND FORMER SENATOR PATRICIO AYLWIN MISSED BEING ARRESTED BY MILITARY PATROL IN TALCA RAIDING AN ALLEGED POLITICAL MEETING BY ONLY TEN OR FIFTEEN MINUTES.
- 2. OCCASION WAS SOCIAL GATHERING OF SOME TWENTY MOSTLY PDC MEMBERS OFFERED AT HOME EVENING MAY 4 AT TALCA BY FORMER DEPUTY GUSTAVO RAMIREZ. MILITARY PATROL UNDER PERSONAL COMMAND OF ZONE COMMANDER SHOWED UP ABOUT 11:30 P.M. TO INVESTIGATE COMPLAINT THAT POLITICAL MEETING WAS BEING HELD. IN ADDITION TO RAMIREZ, OTHER PROMINENT PDC LEADER PRESENT WAS FORMER SENATOR JOSE FONCEA BUT AYLWIN HAD FORTUNATELY JUST DEPARTED. ALL WERE TAKEN TO LOCAL HEADQUARTERS, HELD OVER NIGHT FOR INTERROGATION, AND RELEASED NEXT MORNING WITHOUT ANY CHARGES BEING FILED.
- 3. PARETO, WHO DEVOTES HIMSELF LARGELY TO PDC ACTIVITY AND SAID HE VISITS LOW-INCOME AREAS NEAR SANTIAGO (POBLACIONES) SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK, WAS GLOOMY ABOUT HARDLINE ANTI-POLITICS VIEWS PREVAILING IN CURRENT GOC, VENTURING THAT TROUBLE MUST BE EXPECTED WHEN AUTHORITIES

PAGE 02 SANTIA 02524 0916222

CUT THEMSELVES OFF FROM PEOPLE. ECONOMIC STRAITS OF LOWER INCOME POPULATION SEGMENTS ARE WORSE THAN GOC ADMITS AND NO EASING IS IN, SIGHT, HE FELT. HE DEPICTED

27

10

PARTY AS DIVIDED AND INDECISIVE, BUT WITH THOSE WHO ADVOCATE OUTRIGHT BREAK WITH JUNTA STEADILY WINNING NEW SUPPORT. HE LIKENED THOSE WHO DEFEND JUNTA WITHIN PDC TODAY TO THOSE WHO IN UP YEARS TENDED TO SUPPORT ALLENDE, PARTICULARLY BERNARDO LEIGHTON WHO FOUND HIMSELF INCREASINGLY ISOLATED. HE REMARKED WRYLY THAT BOTH RAMIREZ AND FONCEA ARE AMONG STAUNCHEST SUPPORTERS OF JUNTA IN PDC.

4. COMMENT: IT IS PERHAPS NOT SUPRISING THAT AUTHORITIES SHOULD HAVE STRUCK AT PROVINCIAL GATHERING WHIVVYHAD NATIONAL LEADERS OF PDC AS GUESTS. NEVERTHELESS, ACTION DEMONSTRATES ONCE AGAIN HEAVY HAND THAT IS BECOMING CHARACTERISTIC OF CHILEAN MILITARY IN DEALING WITH ANTI-MARXIST POLITICAL LEADERS.

POPPER



NNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/

*** Current Classification ***

