Augusto Soto: “Each Latin American nation prioritizes Asia in its own way”

Latin America, not unlike the rest of the world, is looking towards Asia as it plans its economic, political and international relations policy. The Asia-Pacific portal questioned Chilean Sinologist, Augusto Soto, regarding his opinion on this issue. He told us that there is a wide variety of policy stances on Asia throughout the various countries in Latin America.

Augusto Soto is a consultant and analyst specializing in China. He has taught in Spain, where he is currently based, and in other countries. He is a member of the Red Iberoamericana de Sinología (RibSi: Iberoamerican Network of Sinology) as well as consultant to the Chile-Pacific Foundation, among other institutions.

How would you describe the current relations between Latin America and Asia?

An answer to this should be made in context and remembering that Latin America is very heterogeneous, a fact reflected in their fragmented foreign policies. Not everyone in Latin America cares about Asia in the same way.

On the other hand, though Latin America is diverse, Asia is to an even greater degree. Their range of ethnicities is even more diversified. So too are their religions, political systems, and levels of economic development; and another truly fundamental issue is their languages, both spoken and written. In Latin America, at least at the state level, almost everyone speaks and writes in two interrelated languages: Spanish and Portuguese. Two Latin American leaders, diplomats or intellectuals can meet in Berlin or Sydney and chat. The probability that this occurs between two Asians of this sort is much less. A language barrier is the norm in these cases, given the diversity of languages in Asia.

Thus, we might say there are several Asias. Namely, there is an Eastern, Southern, Central and Southeast Asia, where 60% of the human race lives.

Then, as I said, each country has its own relations. Foreign and trade policy priorities differ greatly. In South Asia, we have cloistered Myanmar at one extreme, situated right next to India with its ever-increasing commitment to globalization. Then there the case of an isolated North Korea situated right next to South Korea, who also has a commitment to globalization.  

Chile stands out in Latin America, due to its significantly larger emphasis on Asian foreign policy and trade, something which has clearly been good for Chile.

The relationship that Mexico has promoted is significant. It is a pioneer on APEC. But we should not forget the large role that her number one partner, the US, plays here. 

The Venezuelan case is evolving. Caracas has truly diversified its political and commercial relations. Though very much focused on Latin America, it pays great deal of attention to North America, its client and ideological opponent. Caracas is also developing important links with China and Russia.

Brazil and Argentina (for their part) are addressing their policy (needs) on Asia, something which they lacked a generation ago.

But, here again, Chile seems to be leading the region as regards policy focus on Asia-Pacific issues.

That said, and despite the extreme and historical distances between Asia and Latin America, ties between the two regions have strengthened, though mainly in the last generation. They are at an all-time high, in fact. (I should also state that) individual Asian countries, despite the new ties, are more important to Latin American countries (also considered individually) than vice versa.

In your opinion, what is the current state of Latin America knowledge on Asia?

As far as one can tell, (Latin American on the subject of Asia) is imbalanced. Peru and Brazil are more sensitive to Asian countries because they have many descendants of important national communities: Chinese and Japanese, respectively.

Knowledge also differs throughout Latin America for various reasons. In the short-term, a very small proportion of the population has had the opportunity to visit neighboring countries. At best, they have visited a neighboring country. Fortunately the diplomatic, political, financial, cultural and academic elite of Latin America have visited Asia; and more than once. Usually, they visit regularly and exclusively for professional reasons. Another issue is that these visits are the result of specialized studies or they end up studying the area. But all this is very significant and this is how we are going to make progress on (the question you asked). I think that universities are generating a significant number of specialists. Mexicans and Chileans are probably the most advanced as regards pragmatic knowledge of Asian society.

However, Latin American cultural traditions remain anchored to their own region and to the West at large. It should be stressed that there is still an inertia pushing for these age-old cultural and geographical distances to remain. There is still a lot of progress to be made in viewpoints, too. Latin America do not regard Asians with the same respect as they do the West.

Chile wants to take the lead with respect to other Latin American countries. Have we developed the right policies? Can Chile truly be a bridge between Latin America and Asia?

Policies, which will allow Chile to be in the lead, have been adopted. And they are successful: healthy trade flows, the FTAs and good diplomatic and business relations with APEC. One might say, “What else can we do?” After all, these are historic achievements. But these achievements can easily transform into self-complacency.

Obtaining a degree of leadership in Latin America, on some Asia issues (which was Chile’s first-stage goal), does not automatically translate into Chile becoming a bridge between Latin America and Asia.

This grandiloquent phrase does not take into account that Mexico, with advanced links in Asia and unlike the countries of MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), does not need Chilean ports for transhipment trade. Also, Mexico has old ties of different kinds in the Pacific (the Philippines), in addition to APEC links due to its membership in that body.

Secondly, it is easy to find important Latin American countries unwilling to embrace the idea of Chile as a bridge. For historical reasons (which still weigh heavily in Peru and Bolivia). Or in considering whether Chile is a viable bridge or not, does not consider the southern neighbour a good option when it has its own Pacific ports. This is the Peruvian position. As if there is no shortage bad news for the idea, the recent announcement of Brasilia bet for a East-West corridor (connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans) through the Amazon, dramatically reducing the distance to travel to get their products to Asia.

Thirdly, size conspires against the notion of a bridge. Chile means significantly less to Asian countries than vice versa. This does not mean that Latin America lacks true strategic significance in Asia, especially China. But one of the Latin American countries, Chile, convincing Asia that it has the potential to be a bridge, is altogether another story. After all, differences between South American countries and are not that overwhelming. Moreover, economies are also similar. In addition, human resources remain under developed. How many more Chileans speak Chinese, Japanese or Korean than the Peruvians, Argentines or Brazilians? English is no longer enough where Asia is concerned.

Fourth. As I mentioned, we cannot refer to Asia as a whole any more. The relationships are with certain players, with partners. Chile cannot tell an Asian country that is committed to Asia because that does not impress them. Except when Chile is speaking to the United States or another major player, such as Russia, India and the EU (European Union).

However, there is potential for Chile to become a knowledge bridge to improve understanding of Asia at the regional level. That is, Chile might consider creating a know-how and consulting services center dedicated to South Asia. Chile has some elements in its favor. First, it has accumulated knowledge and some negotiators and observers who have multilateral and multi-sector experiences. This is all present in Chile, given its society is more predictable than that of the neighbors at the time of launching national initiatives. The decision-making institutions are also very centralized in Santiago. In other words, we still lack dozens of specialists who speak Korean, Japanese, Chinese and who understand the countries on the other side of the Pacific. But there are ways and a vision to generate this generation of increased specialization.

The eyes of the world are fixed on China of late, but how does China view Latin America? Are they more interested in a broader relationship, apart from economics?

(We might say) China is not just a country, but a veritable continent. The big challenge is to make ourselves more attractive to China’s current and future interests. This needs to be done from our far corner of the globe, Latin America, which (incidentally) receives little news coverage. And when we are in the news, the bad often outweighs the good. And when the good does outweigh the bad, it rarely transcends or is not considered important. Except in the case of sports and soap operas (which bring big benefits to the countries that export same), at the price of maintaining other clichés. Of course, football stories lead the sports news. This is synonymous with Brazil and Argentina. And it is also synonymous with potential tourism.

Not all countries can follow the same recipe. In the case of Chile, many factors result in the nation continuing to be identified with the ideological extremes and traumatic decade of the 1970s. Only a tiny elite in China knows anything about what goes on in Chile.

On the other hand, which is implicit in what I have said, the 2010 Shanghai Expo will combat this perception of a remote Latin America. Specifically, it will convince many influential people, consumers and intellectuals that two Shanghai and Beijing are cities of no little relevance. At least for a while. Chile should project an image which is realistic, yet imaginative. The important thing is that the country has the human and material resources to increase its visibility. What we lack is a consistent projection of a recognizable identity, which is imaginative and realistic.

Beijing is undoubtedly interested (in deepening ties), above and beyond the merely economic and political. Zhongnanhai is interested, given its proclivity for multilateralism and to support causes South-South cooperation.

However, (moving) past the traditional trade, diplomatic and political issues, I think that within ten years we will witness nascent exchange among Asia-Pacific societies. Today, in the era of instant digital communications, the issues between the countries dealt with expressly by the respective governments. This is an age of civil societies. In other words, people do not wait for initiatives coming to trickle down from above on an exclusive basis.

Latin Americans can and should interact more with the Chinese. And this is important. Numerically, China has more internet users than the US, and it wants to be on the cutting edge of new technology. The virtual observatories, exchanges via email and Skype (internet call software) will play a role in bringing societies together in spite of barriers erected to deal with politically sensitive issues.

It has been said that China employs "soft power", even as it emerges as a Great Power. Is there a possibility of conflict with the US or a resurgent Russia?

Two things are certain: one is structural, the other cyclical and interrelated. On the one hand, so far China has used the rules of international institutions which were heavily influenced by the US after the WWII. On the other hand, in recent years there have been constant low-intensity conflicts (commercial and political, mainly) between Washington and Beijing. At the same time, these two nations are the main trading partners in the world, without mentioning the EU, that is. And this is not expected to change. It should be stated that Chinese power is growing quietly. This means that, until now, the increase is not by conquest or as a result of regional or world wars, as in the case of the factors that have enabled the rise of most powers in recent centuries.

It is somewhat paradoxical that the continuous rise of Chinese power is taking place at the expense of the failures of the outgoing Bush administration. Its handling of 9-11 and, insofar as it has been involved, the serious global crisis of the economy in the second half of 2008, involving loss of power and prestige. By contrast, China, on a second level (and third, as it is a Third World country), is interested in the latest conflict and expanding an ideology.

In the case of the Beijing-Moscow relationship, there don’t seem to be any possibilities of conflict in the short and medium term. Both countries are doing a lot better than when they shared an ideology, and even a similar system. And for several years it is expected that they will make common cause with each other in order to advance the multilateral aspects on which they agree. Bet on multipolarity.

India also looms as the other power in the region. It also competes for presence in Africa with China. Will it begin a similar competition in Latin America?

This seems unlikely. India has a certain relationship with the English-speaking Caribbean given immigration there in the nineteenth century. It is also true that in the southern hemisphere, New Delhi shares with the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) trilateral initiative with Brasilia and South Africa within the aforementioned South-South cooperation which is so in vogue lately.

There are elements which may lead us to presume that India and China will not arrive with the same force to compete on equal footing in Latin America. Beijing takes the lead, in principle, despite the India’s English being an undeniable advantage.

The case of Africa is a more level playing field in large part due to the geographical proximity to India. However, China has a large commercial presence on the continent, based on a dynamic diplomacy with a strong tradition.

On the other hand, there is also cooperation. Both China and India are so-called countries "of the future" according to many analysts. That projection includes them alongside Brazil and Russia in the well-known BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The fact that the leaders of these countries are acting with that hypothesis is equally or more important. They are more assertive than at any other time in the last twenty years. Moreover, they are visibly acting in more concerted efforts.

On a strictly bilateral level, we must not forget that Beijing-New Delhi cooperation is yet to take its full shape, including on multilateral issues. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization stands out here, because Beijing is a founding member and New Delhi an observer.

That being said, Chinese-Indian multinationals moving into Latin America remains unseen, though it may be in the works. One (potential) field is software. And it is not the only one. We must look with steady attention at the historic closening of ties started five years ago by these two giants who represent almost half of the world. Of course, some of the trends I predict may be delayed due to the looming global crisis. But in the long term, the planet will be more Asian-oriented at the end of our lives than when born. Without a doubt.