China’s 08 Charter

Hundreds of people in China have signed the so-called Charter 08, a list of political demands that highlight the need to launch a second phase of reform. It is true that the signatories only represent a drop in the ocean of Chinese demographics, but its moral significance cannot be denied, because it faces up to the repressive regime, claiming that " China has many laws but no rule of law; it has a constitution but no constitutional government. The ruling elite continue to cling to their authoritarian power and fight off any move toward political change.” The charter’s content is equivalent to a real agenda for democratic change. But will it have any political effect?

In its White Paper on Democracy (2005), Beijing portrayed its political system, insisting that it would not veer from this path. Two years later, at the XVII Congress of the Communist Party (CCP), the need to inject fresh blood into reform efforts in order to ensure their effectiveness as an instrument capable of running a society that has significantly pluralized as a result of reforms, gaining autonomy in the face of a power suggesting new approaches.

But the CCP has not abdicated its monopoly on power (a central issue addressed by the Charter 08), whereas it considers its monopoly to be a precondition to stability. At best, the CCP would allow an increase in the level of discussion and co-participation. The official program of democratization, inspired by Professor Zhou Tianyong, director of the center of political analysis of the Central Party School, set the goal of initiating measures by 2020, focusing, during this phase, on the transformation of the state and on strong investment in social order in order to configure a modern and mature society.

But the truth is that after the Olympic Games, Beijing appears to have thrown the bolt again: resumption of executions, inflexible language and hard bargaining with Dalai Lama representatives, detention of activists for human rights, more control over the Internet and media ... The promises of transparency, increased social autonomy, broad and progressive recognition of individual liberties, gave way a prioritizing of punitive action and making examples against corruption, which enjoys wide popular support, while, in the most utmost silence, it attempts to isolate any political dissent. In an article published January 18, 2009, in the journal Qiushi, Jia Qinglin, one of the top Chinese leadership, warned against "the false ideal of democracy in the West," clearly demarcating the limits of the regime's ideological evolution.

Behind these actions is fear of the proclamation of the Charter 08 and instability derived from the current crisis, which is impacting China's economy harder than expected. Millions of rural workers who have lost their jobs are returning to the countryside, where their chances of employment are very small and social networks are practically non-existent. In urban areas, unemployment is currently at nearly three times the officially-stated (4.2%) and growing. The dreaded cholera could break out.

Given this situation, the Chinese government has reacted on several different levels. The stimulus packages (four billion Yuan) comprised one level. Greater social investment was another. The regime has also intensified policies in order to capitalize upon the crisis and manage change within the development model. In any case, it does not plan to speed up political reform, fearing that any change might lead to a gradual disintegration of the system. Consequently, all energies are being focused on ensuring internal tranquility with the same, old methods as usual. But will this suffice?

There has been a surge of social upheaval at the local level and Beijing has instructed the police to handle riots astutely. The nation’s top leaders, who are conservative by nature, often intensify protests due to their clumsiness, lack of constituent support and the nervousness slowly creeping into rural areas and large cities. Some authorities (in the western province of Gansu) have been punished for their repression "routine". Beijing has ordered officials to handle riots with caution, stating they should be especially careful to avoid provoking incidents in other areas.

But the crisis and its effects are not the only issues at play. This is a difficult year due to the various sensitive anniversaries (the revolt in Tibet that ended with the exile of the Dalai Lama, the Tiananmen Square incident, Falungong). A chain reaction may become uncontrollable. The 08 Charter is “muddling the water to catch the fish” (Hun Shui Mo Yu) and, as in his inaugural speech, with so much emphasis on defense of values and principles, Obama might find a more receptive ally in his future dialogues with Beijing.

Who is betting on democracy in China? Not the new economic powers, who have good connections with the regime and who benefit greatly from its continued existence. Nor the vast army of officials who daily grease the gears of the system, showing a high capacity for adaptation. In many officials, as with students, patriotism, among the rich and poor, envelopes every challenge. Moreover, the low-income group spearheading the protests, are linked to local phenomena, in many cases without losing hope that Beijing will solve their problems.

In China’s long transition process, hopes for democracy appear to be dwindling once again. Economic expectations are also more measured, resulting in the central power retaining political control of key areas and keeping all political issues on a short leash as it remains a decisive actor at all levels. Moreover, it seems that whoever takes the reins, will not lead the country down the road to a western-style plurality.

The status quo is not an alternative, because it leads directly to a blocking and choking of the entire system. But the CCP, on the razor's edge, will continue its acrobatics, adapting what it can, calling for the gradual substitution of Maoism, though not with Western democracy as suggested in Charter 08, but with a government of virtue and other Confucian diatribes, a proposal consistent with its overall strategy of limiting any effective role of civil society.