Diplomatic and political stability on the Korean peninsula

Officially, the Korean War (1950-1953) ended with the ceasefire proposed by United Nations Supervisory Commission (UNSC), which, in turn, led to the Military Armistice Agreement (MAA). This legal and political framework remains in force to this day and is the instrument by which the fragile relations between the Republic of South Korea (ROK) and the People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) maintained. However, the MAA was designed and approved during time of war, aimed at halting hostilities and was signed by the military commanders of the warring parties. It was considered temporary measure which would eventually be replaced. During the 1950s and 1960s negotiations began to create a permanent legal agreement. These were not successful, due to a lack of consensus on the withdrawal of non-Korean forces from the region, the call for general elections in the territory and the UN’s authority on the peninsula in those years. Later negotiations during the first half of the 1980s had similar results.

By the end of the 1960s, for most of the 1970s, and during the first third of the 1980s, the North Korean economy was structured along the lines of a centrally-planned model for industrial development. Its average growth remained low, but steady, although strong shortages of basic goods prevailed. However, the North Korean regime progressed with relative socio-economic stability during the change of leadership after the death of Kim Il Sung. But the abrupt disappearance of real socialism and the competitive effects of globalization during the first third of the 1990s undermined the foundations of that virtual stability. Since the last third of that decade up until the present day, the country has entered fully into an acute economic crisis, compounded by errors in design and economic performance. Hefty military expenditures and the cost of the nuclear program exceeded the possibilities of the economy, plunging the country into a crisis that some analysts do not hesitate to qualify as terminal.

The political-economic transformations of the People's Republic of China (once the DPRK’s closest ally) since the mid-80s, has led to the expansion and consolidation of ties with South Korea, causing an apparent rift between the two countries. However, China still considers the Korean peninsula as an area of vital strategic importance and is opposed to any other regional power exercising any kind of hegemonic pressure on it. This makes the PRC a more valid interlocutor than other countries in the context of the rhetorical aggression of North Korean diplomacy.

A third actor is the Russian Federation, which has shown little willingness to dispense with the benefits of its prosperous trade with South Korea, ostensibly moving it away from the DPRK, which it considers a less profitable partner. Certainly, this has contributed to the isolation of the DPRK in north Asia.

Finally, the Republic of Korea has consolidated its socio-economic development, becoming one of the strongest economies in the region and the world, besides being a model for transformation and socio-economic policy for several Asian societies. The political democratization of the 1980s and 1990s has helped in this regard, giving the ROK greater credibility and legitimacy in its foreign policy. At the same time, it has reinforced its bilateral ties with the United States under the Mutual Defense Treaty.

In conclusion, this cursory examination of the diplomatic and political context of the Korean peninsula does not augur well, despite recent multilateral efforts. Something that may have a positive effect may be an eventual Korean reunification, an issue that deserves its own separate treatment.