The rise of Asia and the West’s response (Part 3)

Ikenberry: a world beyond the "unipolar moment" of the United States

In his recent study published in Foreign Affairs about the rise of China and the future of the West, John Ikenberry argues that China's rise is certainly "one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century" (Ikenberry, page 23). The extraordinary economic growth of China and its active diplomacy are transforming East Asia "and future decades will see even an even bigger increase in the power and influence of China." However, "just how it has to represent this drama is an open question." “Will China defeat the existing order or become a part of it?” and “What can the USA do - if anything - to maintain its position as China emerges.”

According to Ikenberry, some authors argue that "the American Era" is coming to an end and that the "Western-oriented" world is being replaced by one that is "increasingly dominated by the East." Those who hold "realist" positions argue that China will use its power shape the international system institutions in order to serve its interests, and that the declining "hegemon” will begin to see China as a “threat to its security.” The result, these experts predict, will be "strains, mistrust and conflict: the typical characteristics of any power transitions.”

However, Ikenberry believes that this course of action is not inevitable (page 24).

China's rise need not trigger a “violent hegemonic transition.”  The US-China transition may be very different from those of the past because China faces a different world, not only facing US hegemony. Rather it faces an entire Western-centered system, which is open, integrated, rules-based, and "with broad and deep political foundations." The US was not just a world power. It also “led the creation of universal institutions.” “Today, China can gain full access and grow vigorously within this system.”

In this context, Ikenberry argues that:

- The "unipolar moment" of the United States, emerged at the end of the Cold War, "will inevitably end" (Ikenberry, page 25).

- If the defining struggle in the 21^st Century is between China and the United States, "China will have the advantage."

- If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, "the West will triumph."

Ikenberry acknowledges that China "is on course to become a formidable global power" (page 26). Its economy has quadrupled since the late 70s. It is also one of the largest centers of manufacturing, has accumulated massive foreign reserves of over one trillion dollars by 2006, consumes one-third of the global demand for iron, steel and coal and increases its military spending at a rate of 18% per annum. Its diplomacy has spread not only in Asia but also in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

Citing scholars such as Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin, Ikenberry states that “transitions of power are a recurring problem in international relations.” Emerging powers want to "translate their new power into greater authority within the global system." These moments have hidden dangers and have generated war in the past, "but not all power transitions generate war or destroy the old order" (Ikenberry, page 27).

The academic from Princeton attaches great importance to the "dense" system of rules and institutions related to global and regional as "economic, political and security" (Ikenberry, page 30). These features create "incentives for China to integrate the liberal international system", which is reinforced by the "new interdependence driven by technology."

For Ikenberry, various trends are conducive to integration:

- "The most visionary Chinese leaders" understand that globalization has changed the game. In accordance with that, "China needs strong and prosperous partners around the world."

- The framework of institutions and system rules have already begun to accommodate and facilitate the integration of China, a nation that is already “making use of such institutions to promote the development of the country in its global power status”(page 32).

- Factors, such as the abovementioned, push the U.S. and Europe to “find place at the table not only for China but also countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa. The author cites a Goldman Sachs study, according to which the combined economies of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) will be, by the year 2050, larger than those of the original G-6 (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States)” (Ikenberry, page 35).

A debate that will be with us for years

The rise of Asia and its impact on the global order and particularly in the West and the United States is a theme that will be debated often during the coming years. This is not a case where conclusions are made on an open issue. However, Mahbubani and Ikenberry offer valuable viewpoints that provide elements to consider.

The truth is that the "hegemon" will remain so in the military and nuclear sectors. The West will continue its strong presence in international political and economic institutions, but with increasingly strong pressure to make inroads of change vis-à-vis reality, not only regarding China, but making clear there is a price to be paid as reflected in its slowdown – and eventual collapsing - of the Doha round.

China, for its part, is strengthened in all the attributes of power - even in its significant spending on military, and particularly in productive capacity and economic and its formation of networks with other countries in East and Southeast Asia, to which is added the growing technological power, India. They are facing the internal challenges of overcoming poverty, on which they have made remarkable progress. In the economic sphere, its interaction with the Western economy in an interdependent world is very strong and we cannot forget that it represents 62.6% of global GDP, rising to 72.7% if we add in Japan, attracting the vast majority of the largest Fortune 500 multinational companies.

The March of Asia to Modernity, which is Mahbubani first stage, is a reality that the West might as well take seriously and with a constructive spirit. There are signs which lead one to believe that Europe will continue to make use of its veto on some reforms to international institutions and adopting protectionist measures, including ingredients of Mahbubani’s second.

In the third scenario, "the triumph of the West" which Mahbubani effectively rules out, is found in a much more nuanced variant with Ikenberry, who recognizes the growth of Asia and China and also India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and others, in every sense.

What about a fourth scenario? In fact, based on comments from Ikenberry predicting another scenario based on the West's ability to integrate and accommodate new entrants to the Asian system, a (Fourth scenario) would require changes that the institutions, rules and political will, both in China and Asia, as well as the United States, the European Union and the West, in order to create the conditions for an evolution of the current situation. It will be necessary to devise incentives for the emerging powers to choose this course of action. It is not "the triumph of the West", but neither is it its defeat.

The various scenarios strengths and challenges also hold a promise.

The promise is that the transition to a more pluralist order - with a strong Asian presence - seems to have different characteristics to that of other similar processes; an integration of national economies, information and societies that creates a mutual interdependency or dependency which requires a vast network of exchanges and negotiations in public and in private, at the national, international and transnational level. Mahbubani is correct in giving a reason why the FTAs are of greater strategic than commercial value. This is what Chile is betting on, for example (though not mentioned by our two authors) as it attempts to gain access to large markets in the West, Asia and other regions, without having to wait for a consolidation universal norms governing trade.

This is a challenge for China. Mahbubani recognizes this, although partly. His reason is the lack of democracy and freedom of information in China. The author acknowledges this, but also points out that it is used by some in the West to diminish the legitimacy of China’s claims to a greater role in global institutions. In any case, it is clear that it cannot to claim a leadership role internationally without allowing its people freedom of information. There is no doubt that these values “Western” are, in the twenty-first century, universal rights.

Mahbubani is only tangentially addresses Latin America, along with Africa and other developing regions, as being affected or aggrieved by its contacts with the West. Geographically, Latin America is part of the Western world. However, the author expresses concern that such a concept, defined by developed countries such as the US, Europe, and the rest of the anglosphere in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, make up an "implicit compact" in "global policy" (page 3).

However, the author refers to APEC in positive terms as an example of an East-West partnership that is getting off the runway, despite "cultural differences" (Mahbubani, page 264). In APEC we see a confluence of Asian, Oceania, North American economies and Latin American countries like Mexico, Chile and Peru. Russia is also present. APEC has proven to be a good forum in terms of fruitful cooperation among its members. In the case of Chile, in our opinion, the interaction with countries of East and Southeast Asia at APEC has served to inculcate better understanding, not to mention trade and cooperation agreements.